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I. INTRODUCTION
The fall of the Enron Corporation in 2001 was a collapse of
breathtaking proportions. A giant among the nation's business enterprises
was reduced to shambles. In addition to the company, there were many
individual losers, including most prominently, the employee shareholders,
whose pension plans consisted largely of Enron stock.' Why did the
employees follow such a foolish course by investing so heavily in Enron
stock?2 Was it because the company required or at least encouraged it,
even on the eve of its collapse?
It appears that Enron had entered into several clear conflict-of-interest
transactions with a corporate officer, which were hopelessly losing
propositions for the company, yet beneficial for the officer.3 When the
deals were finally brought to light, it was revealed that the company had
failed to report an additional $25 billion in these "'off balance sheet'
* Associate Professor , Pace University School of Law, J.D. , Georgetown University
Law Center, B.S., Towson State University.
1. Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DuQ.
L. REv. 69, 99 (2002).
2. At the end of 2001, $1.3 billion of the pension plan's $2.1 billion assets was
invested in Enron stock. Id. at 92.
3. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate
Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 855, 861-62 (2003). These transactions
were not disclosed on the company's regular books. Id; see also Charles J. Tabb, The
Enron Bankruptcy, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 303, 304
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). There were several other mischievous
transactions occurring at the company that were contrived to present a false image of the
company's financial state. See Reece, supra note 1, at 142-48 (outlining the events that
occurred prior to Enron's collapse).
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liabilities."4 The public reaction to disclosure of these transactions was a
massive sell off of Enron stock, causing a plunge in the stock price in a
matter of months from a high of $90.00 to a low of $1.00, eventually
sending the company into bankruptcy.' But alas, Enron does not stand
alone in the annals of fallen corporate giants on account of financial
wrongdoing, as many other companies would follow in its wake.6 In
virtually all of these cases, non-employee shareholders filed suit, seeking to
hold corporations and their directors liable under the securities laws for
accounting misdeeds.7 Employee shareholders also sued companies and
4. Tabb, supra note 3.
5. Reece, supra note 1, at 99.
6. See, e.g., Ex Rite Aid Chief Pleads Guilty in Billion Dollars Fraud Scandals, BALT.
SuN, June 18, 2003, IA (reporting on massive accounting fraud, prompting the guilty plea
by the CEO and restatement of net income by $1.6 billion dollars); Andrew Countryman,
SEC Charges Healthsouth Rigged Profits by $1.4 billion, CHI. TRIB., March 20, 2003, CI
(reporting on accounting misdeeds; overstatement of earnings by $1.4 billion over 3 V2
years; stock prices dropped to $3.91 from a high of $30.81, five years earlier); Andrew Ross
Sorkin & Alex Bernson, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Tyco Admits Using
Accounting Tricks to Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, Al, (reporting on
accounting abuses and restatement of earnings by $382 million); David Lieberman,
Adelphia Plans to File Chapter 11, U.S.A. TODAY, June 24, 2002, BO (reporting on the
filing of bankruptcy in the wake of accounting misdeeds, including the borrowing of $3.1
billion by a family partnership, and causing the stock price to plummet).
7. See e.g., David Voreacos, Ex Rite Aid CEO Will Plead Guilty, SEATTLE TIMES, June
17, 2003, C7 (reporting that Rite Aid Settled Shareholder Suits by paying $155 million in
notes and $45 million in cash from insurance proceeds); Alex Pham & David Colker,
Global Crossing Ex-Execs to Pay $324 million, L.A. TIMES, March 20, 2004, C l (reporting
on settlement of shareholder suit brought in wake of accounting fraud charges; improper
accounting led to inflated revenues, investor stock previously worth $40 billon, now
worthless); Lisa Girion, CALSTRS Sues Qwestfor Loss, L.A. TIMES, December 11, 2002,
C 13 (reporting on suit filed by pension plan charging improper accounting).
In the aftermath of the scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, which imposes rigorous
accounting review and reporting procedures on corporations and public accounting firms.
First, the Act established "the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to
oversee the audit of public companies". The PCAOB was charged with, among other
things, the registration of public accounting firms, adoption of rules on auditing, ethics,
investigating improper conduct, disciplining companies, and enforcement of professional
standards. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Act prohibits accounting firms
from also providing a variety of non-audit advisory services, including "bookkeeping,"
"financial information systems design and implementation;" "appraisal or valuation
services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports;" Id. at § 201 (g)(1)-(9). The Act
further required public companies to set up audit committees composed of independent
"member[s] of the board of directors". Id. at § 301(3) (adding section 10A(m)(3)(A) to
Securities Act of 1934). The audit committee is to have direct responsibility for the
"oversight of the work" of the company's accounting firm, id. at § 301 (adding section
10A(m)(2) to Securities Act of 1934), and must set up "procedures for the receipt ... of
complaints" and "anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters." Id. at § 301 (adding section 10A(m)(4)(A),
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corporate insiders who were pension plan fiduciaries to recover for losses
to their pension plans.' These employees alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
by the plan trustees for continuing to fund the plan with the company's
stock and for not divesting the plan of the company's stock despite being in
possession of information that suggested continued investment was not
wise.9 But, divesting a pension plan of the company's stock based on
inside information would mean trading it to a purchaser on the open market
who did not possess the same information. The pension plan fiduciary is
thus in a double bind: as a pension plan fiduciary, he has a duty under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 10 to act to
protect the assets of the plan, but as a corporate insider whose company's
shares are being traded, he has a duty under the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 not to trade or cause a trade on the basis of material non-public
information.
The courts considering an apparently irreconcilable conflict of duty
have taken conflicting views. The rulings on both sides of the issue are
unsatisfying in that they offer no clear policy basis for one position over the
other and provide the fiduciary and the corporate insider with little
guidance on the proper course of action.
This Article examines this seeming irreconcilable conflict faced by the
pension plan fiduciary, who is a corporate insider, to disclose or not to
disclose material, inside information to plan participants, who would use
the information to divest investments in company stock, without disclosing
(B)).
Both the CEO and CFO must certify that periodic reports filed "do[] not contain any untrue
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made ... not misleading" and that "the financial statements .... fairly present..
. the financial condition of the issuer .. " Id. at § 302(a)(1)-(3). The signing officers must
further certify that adequate internal controls have been set up to ensure receipt of
information and that any "significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls" are reported to the company's auditors. Id. at § 302.
Another part of the Act prohibits the making or extension of any loan to a director or
executive officer. Id. at § 402 (adding subsection k to section 13 of the Securities Act of
1934). The SEC is to prescribe rules requiring "an internal control report", for financial
reporting. Id. at § 404(a)(1)-(2). The SEC must also adopt rules "to require each issuer...
to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of
ethics for senior financial officers .. , id. at § 406, including "such standards as are
reasonably necessary to promote... honest and ethical conduct." Id. at § 406(c).
8. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & "ERISA" Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (involving a cause of action by employees of Enron who participated in
three pension benefit plans against Enron officers, plan administrators, and Enron's public
accounting firm); In re Worldcom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (involving a
class action by Worldcom employees who participated in a retirement plan against
Worldcom officers and the plan trustee).
9. See cases discussed infra Part V.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006). See discussion of fiduciary duties, infra, Part IV.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
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the same information to persons on the other side of these trades. The
Article begins with a general discussion of the regulation of trade in
securities and the history of the insider trading laws under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Part III discusses the soundness of the prohibition
against insider trading. Part IV explains the duties imposed on pension
plan fiduciaries and how they appear to conflict with the corporate
fiduciary's duty not to trade based upon non-public, inside information.
Part V discusses the varying positions taken by the courts that have
considered the issue. Finally, Part VI explains ways of reconciling the two
duties.
II. THE REGULATION OF TRADE IN SECURITIES: FORMAL AND TRUTHFUL
DISCLOSURE
The object of the regulation of securities is truthful and meaningful
disclosure. The two main laws that require formal disclosure about the
facts of a company issuing securities are the Securities Act of 193312 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." The basic strategy of the 1933 Act
is to specify mandatory disclosure documents, the prospectus and
registration statement, 14 and to prohibit the sale or offer for sale of any
security that has not been registered with the SEC 5 or accompanied by a
prospectus.1 6  Registration is intended to provide such disclosure of
material facts concerning the company and the securities it proposes to sell,
to enable investors to make a realistic appraisal of the merits of the
securities and then exercise informed judgment in determining whether to
purchase them.'7  Registration requires, but does not guarantee, the
accuracy of facts represented in the registration. While the Act prohibits
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq. (2006).
13. 15 U.S.C.§ 77b, et seq. (2006).
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2004); see also U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited May 5, 2006).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2004).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000). If written materials that do not comply with SEC
rules are used prior to the effective date of the registration statement, or if any oral selling of
the securities occurs by the corporation or its agents, the investor is entitled to rescind or
recover recissory damages, irrespective of whether full disclosure had been made. 15
U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (2004).
17. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 14. Registration requires "a
description of the company's properties and business; a description of the security to be
offered for sale [and its relationship to the company's other capital securities); information
about the management of the company; and financial statements certified by independent
accountants." Id.
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false and misleading statements under penalty of fine or imprisonment,18 it
does not preclude the sale of stocks in risky or poorly managed or
unprofitable companies or even harebrained schemes. It only requires
enough information so that the investor could see, were he astute, that it is
so. 
1 9
The other formal disclosure law, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
requires periodic and continuous disclosure by certain companies.20
However, unlike the prospectus, these periodic reports 2' are not required to
be distributed to investors or shareholders, but are only filed with the SEC.
In large measure, these reports are not written to be comprehended by the
average lay investor, because of their factual density and quantitative
nature. However, as part of a company's annual report, the SEC requires
that companies prepare a "basic information package",22 which should
contain in a narrative, manageable form, a discussion by management of
the general conditions and operations of the company, discussing both
adverse and favorable trends and uncertainties.23
A. Ad Hoc Disclosure Required Where Corporation has Chosen to Speak
Apart from the specific formal disclosure requirements of the
securities acts, it seems fairly well-settled that corporations and corporate
insiders have no general duty to disclose all non-public material
18. Id. Liability under the Act for material omissions or false statements is strict for the
issuer and based on negligence for secondary participants (including members of the board,
underwriters, accountants) who have to prove they exercised "due diligence" under the
circumstances to escape liability. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A),(B), (D) (2004).
19. Indeed, it is unlawful to represent that the Commission approves or disapproves of
securities on the merits. 15 U.S.C. § 77w (2004).
20. The companies are those that have both a class of equity securities having more
than five hundred shareholders of record and more than $10 million in total assets. 15
U.S.C. § 12(g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2006).
21. Companies must file a number of reports periodically, including an annual report
10-K (17 C.F.R. § 249.310), containing audited financial statements and information on the
issuer and its operations, a quarterly report 10-Q (17 C.F.R. § 249.308a), containing
unaudited financial statements, and a report 8-K, disclosing certain material changes in the
company's condition or operations within a specified period of time after they arise. (17
C.F.R. § 249.308). See generally U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and
Exchange Commission Form List, www.sec.gov/about/forms/secforms.htm (last visited July
17, 2007) (listing forms for SEC filings and their descriptions).
22. Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and
Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, SEC Release No. 33-6321, 45
Fed. Reg. 63630 (September 25, 1980).
23. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Item 303, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006); Management
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-6835 (May 18, 1989);
Interpretation, Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Release No. 33-8350 (December 29, 2003).
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information that it has about the corporation to shareholders. 4 However,
when a corporation makes a disclosure voluntarily or involuntarily, "there
is a duty to make it complete and accurate. "
25
As it stands, in order to encourage and shore up investments,
corporations often make "forward-looking statements", which purport to
reflect predictions about earnings, revenue and future economic
performance.26 So long as these statements contain sufficient cautionary
language and are not knowingly misleading, corporations are not liable if
the predictions do not come true. 7
B. Anti-fraud Provisions Under Section 10(b) and Rule JOb-5
The dilemma of the pension plan fiduciary and corporate insider being
explored here would be covered by § 10(b) of the 1934 Act,28 which
provides that it is unlawful
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe ....9
Pursuant to § 10(b), the Commission has adopted Rule 1 Ob-5 which
makes unlawful
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
24. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1125 (10th Cir. 1997); Reiss v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 229 (1988) (implicitly finding that there was no general duty to
disclose merger talks, but concluding that liability existed where a corporation chose to
speak untruthfully). A corporation, though not under an original duty to disclose or speak
publicly, after having done so, may be under a duty to update an earlier statement, such as
where material changes have occurred. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310 (3d
Cir. 1997); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990). The stock
exchanges require listed companies to promptly disclose to the affected securities markets
material nonpublic information. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual
§§ 202.03-202.06.
25. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 561 (6th Cir. 2001); Rubin v. Schottenstein,
Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998); Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987,
992 (1st Cir. 1996); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267; Sailor v. N. States
Power Co., 4 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1993).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1).
27. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2; 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (containing requirements for soft
information that issuer must satisfy for protection under safe harbor).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2004). Various other sections of the 1934 Act impose liability
upon issuers and their officers for making false and misleading statements or omitting to
state a material fact necessary to make statements true. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§
11, 12, and 17; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k, 781, 78q (2004).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 0
The statute and regulation are interpreted to make "insider trading"
fraudulent. Two theories of "insider trading" under these laws have
emerged from the courts and the SEC. Under the "traditional" or "classical
theory," § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are violated when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, non-
public information, without disclosing that information to the party on the
other side of the transaction. Such trading is deceptive
. . . because a relationship of trust and confidence [exists]
between shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who
have obtained confidential information by reason of their position
with that corporation.3' [That relationship] gives rise to a duty to
disclose [or to abstain from trading] because of the necessity of
preventing a corporate insider from... tak[ing] unfair advantage
of... uninformed... stockholders.32
At common law, trading on inside information over the stock
exchange was not regarded as unlawful or a breach of fiduciary duty by a
director to a shareholder because directors were deemed to owe fiduciary
duties to their corporations, not to individual shareholders.33 However, as
an exception, the "special facts" doctrine worked to impose liability for
non-disclosure of material facts in face-to-face securities transactions.34
The interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 departed from the
common law rule and imposed liability upon an insider for trading on the
open market. In the first significant SEC enforcement action under § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,35 the SEC held an insider liable
for trades in the open market based upon two rationales: "the existence of a
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
31. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (alteration in original).
32. Id. at 652 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980))
(alteration in original).
33. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
34. In Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) the Court ruled that even if a director
has no general duty to disclose facts known to him before he purchases shares, there are
cases where "by reason of special facts, such a duty exists." There, defendant, a director of
the corporation and large stockholder, in charge of negotiations for the sale of certain lands
by the corporation to the United States government, which sale would result in increased
value to the corporation, failed to disclose these facts, particularly his control over the
negotiations, to the seller of shares. Id. at 433.
35. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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relationship giving access. .. to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose ... " and the "inherent unfairness involved where a
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing.,
36
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,3' affirmed the rule
that prohibited such trading by insiders and developed a further
justification for it. Under the "equal access to information theory," the
securities disclosure rules should be construed to promote the "justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information."3  This meant that there should be parity of information
among market participants and "anyone in possession of material, inside
non-public information" was required to "either disclose it to the investing
public" or "abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned while such information remained undisclosed.0
9
However, these theories were later rejected by the Supreme Court in
Chiarella v. United States,4 where the Court held that not all instances of
unfairness amount to fraud. In the case of nondisclosure, fraud occurs only
if there is nondisclosure when there is a duty to speak. 4' A duty to speak
arises in the case of a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties.4 2  In Chiarella, a printer whose
company printed documents used in impending tender offers, and who
bought shares based upon the information deciphered from these
documents, did not engage in fraudulent conduct toward the sellers of those
shares by his silence in the absence of any fiduciary relationship or
relationship of trust and confidence with the company whose shares were
traded or with the shareholders.43
1. Outsider Trading by Tippees
After Chiarella, the SEC sought to hold certain outsiders, those
persons who acquired material non-public information from corporate
insiders liable for insider trading; that they acquired the fiduciary duties of
their inside sources merely by receiving inside information from them. But
this argument too was rejected by the Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC.44
36. Id. at 912.
37. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
38. Id. at 848.
39. Id.
40. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
41. Id. at 230.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 233.
44. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, an insider, Secrist, disclosed to Dirks, a stock
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The Court affirmed its ruling in Chiarella that "[a duty to disclose] arises
from the relationship between the parties. . . and not merely from one's
ability to acquire information because of his position in the market. '45 As
such, a tippee can be liable for trading on the basis of material non-public
information only when the tippee knows or should have known that the
disclosure of the information by the insider was improper and the tipper
received some personal benefit from the disclosure.46
2. Rule 14e-3
The SEC responded to the potential loopholes and limitations left after
Chiarella and Dirks by adopting Rule 14e-3.47 The rule makes it unlawful
to trade in shares the subject of a tender offer based on information
obtained directly or indirectly from the tender offeror, the target company
or insider of either of these persons, unless that information is public. This
prohibition applies without regard to the existence of any common law
fiduciary relationship between the trader and the corporation whose shares
are traded or the shareholders, as required under Rule lOb-5. The Supreme
Court upheld the power of the SEC to adopt such a rule despite this
omission on the theory that the SEC's prophylactic rulemaking power
under § 14(e) was much broader than that under § 10(b); that the SEC
could adopt measures "to prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under
common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition [was] 'reasonably designed to
prevent ... acts and practices that [were] fraudulent . . . .""
If Rule 14e-3 seemed to plug a loophole in the theory of insider
trading, it also resulted in the anomalous treatment of tender offers in
comparison to the treatment of other securities transactions.49
analyst, that massive fraud was occurring at the company, Equity Funding. Dirks passed the
information along to some of his clients, who dumped $16 million worth of Equity Funding
stock.
45. Id. at 657-58 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33, n.14). The Court stated "[a]s
market values fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete and incorrect
information, there always are winners and losers, but those who have 'lost' have not
necessarily been defrauded. On the other hand, inside trading for personal gain is
fraudulent, and in violation of the federal securities laws." Id. at 667.
46. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-61, 662. That benefit could be direct as cash or indirect as a
reputational advantage which could translate into a personal gain in the future, or it could be
evidence of a "relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro
quo." Id. at 664. Even an attempt to make a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend can suffice, that being the same as the insider trading and giving the
proceeds to the relative or friend. Id. at 664.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2006).
48. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)).
49. For example, in SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 758 (W.D. Okla. 1984), a famous
football coach overheard a discussion by a corporate insider about an impending merger,
bought shares based on this information then sold them in response to the announcement of
20071
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C. Fraud on the Source of the Information
The other theory of insider trading is the misappropriation theory,
under which one can be liable for trading on information in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information.50
"[This theory] premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information."' 1 The anomaly here is that one avoids liability under the
misappropriation theory by disclosing an intent to trade to the source of the
information before trading, since this disclosure avoids the deception.52
But, this still leaves the party on the other side of the transaction exposed
and subject to injury if disclosure is also not made to her.53
the merger, at a profit. He was convicted under insider trading laws, but his conviction was
overturned as the trading took place before the adoption of Rule 14e-3 and was thus
governed by Chiarella. Since he had no duty to the corporation or the shareholders from
whom he purchased his stock, he was not liable under Rule lOb-5. However, if the
transaction had been structured as a tender offer and Rule 14e-3 applied, his conviction
would have stood.
50. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (internal citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 655.
53. Until recently, selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by corporate
insiders to institutional investors, analysts and other market insiders was not proscribed by
statute or regulation, absent a showing that the selective disclosure was made for the
purpose of a personal benefit to the insider doing the disclosing. In August 2000, the SEC
enacted Regulation FD. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release
No. 43,154 [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, and 83,676 (Aug. 15,
2000), 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a). The SEC was concerned with the apparent unfairness of the
selective disclosures, including that issuers often disclosed important nonpublic information,
such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts and institutional
investors before making the information public, with the result that the investing public was
not on an equal footing with market insiders and would therefore lose confidence in the
integrity of the marketplace. Further, selective disclosure looked very much like tipping
inside information. Also, the SEC saw a threat to the integrity of the markets by insiders
selectively disclosing information in hopes of favorable reviews by analysts. Id. at 83,677-
78. The rule requires that if an issuer makes disclosure of material information (including
about "earnings", "mergers", "changes in assets", "new products") to selected persons, it
must also make a public disclosure of the same information, simultaneously if the disclosure
was intentional, 17 C.F.R. §243.100(a), 243.101(e) or within 24 hours or by the opening of
the stock exchange the next day, if unintentional. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d). The regulation
expressly excludes a "person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer," such as a
temporary insider; and a "person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information
in confidence" 17 C.F.R.§ 243.100(b)(2). See generally Securities Exchange Release No.
43,154.
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
III. THE SOUNDNESS OF THE POLICY BEHIND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
INSIDER TRADING
There are at least three commonly offered justifications for the
prohibition of insider trading:
1. to ensure fairness and equity--based on the "inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of [inside]
information, knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing;
54
2. to promote the flow of information to the market, allowing it
to better perform its function of evaluating securities and
allocating capital--the "integrity of the market" theory; and
3. to protect the property rights of the corporation whose
information is the basis for insider trading--"information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone." 5
All three justifications, though, have been intensely debated. The
unfairness is questioned on the assertion that insider trading does not cause
trading by persons on the other side of the transaction because they would
have been in the market anyway, and that it is a victimless offense.57
54. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
55. Id.; see generally Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading, Rule 1Ob-5, Disclosure and
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980) (examining the rationales behind insider
trading prohibitions).
56. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 11 SuP. CT. REV. 309 (1981). Easterbrook argues that
even if trading by insiders cause other traders to sell before the rise in stock price after
disclosure of material information, and "insider trading ... reduces the likelihood that an
active trader will obtain the highest possible price, investors might still not be harmed." Id.
at 325. "If there is a chance that they will be short-changed as a result of insiders'
purchases, shareholders will respond by bidding less for the stock in the first place. The
lower price compensates for the ex ante risk." Id. Easterbrook explains: "If the discount
accurately reflects the odds, then it is hard to see any unfairness in the process." Id. And,
"because all traders, at any given time, deal at the same price, the self-protective moves of
sophisticated traders protect the unsophisticated as well." Id. "The stockholders who lose
out in one round of insider trading are compensated by the increased gains they obtain if
their shares (purchased at a small discount) are not scooped up by insiders and thus
appreciate more in other cases." Id. However, the fallacy in this argument is in the "ifs"
and the assumption that purchasers are knowledgeable about the frequency of insider
trading; are sufficiently astute to discount the value of the shares; and that shareholders
know the odds.
57. Manne argued that insider trading is a victimless crime, because the insider's trades
did not prompt the investors' trade; they would have been in the market anyway, trading for
their own reasons, and would perhaps have traded at less favorable prices if the insiders had
not also been in the market. HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKETS
99-103 (1966). The theory being that the insiders' trades forced the stock price downward,
resulting in a lowered purchase price to the outside trader and consequently a smaller loss
after announcement of material adverse information causing a decline in the stock price. Id.
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Some have criticized Chiarella in recognizing that anonymous trading
on an impersonal exchange, which contains no "communicative content"
could be said to be fraudulent as to persons who are trading
contemporaneously," raising the question as to how insider trading can
mislead and thus how a prohibition serves to avert deception.5 9  In
response, one could say that purchasers of shares on an anonymous market
are relying on a representation by the seller through his failure to disclose,
that the market price reflects all available information necessary to setting a
price, when in fact the insider/trader knows otherwise. Therein lies the
deception. It seems that a more coherent basis for the prohibition concerns
notions of fairness--that insiders should not profit from information
obtained from their positions while the other beneficial owners of the
corporation are disadvantaged.6 °
Second, under the integrity of the market theory, the goal is to ensure
that traders make deals based upon the same available information. 6' Full
information will reduce market volatility and investors will be inclined to
enter the market without fear of acting in ignorance of material
information. These effects will in turn produce greater allocative efficiency
of the market.62
Ian Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, attempts to refute
Manne's argument that outside investors are not harmed: that any investor whose decision
to enter the market, is in any way sensitive to price, is injured because such trader may find
a "match in the market only because of the presence of insiders generating additional supply
or demand on the other side." Id. at 164.
58. Donald C. Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies,
Anomalies, and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV.
399, 402 (1988).
59. Id. at 402-03.
60. Id.
61. Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Non public
Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1118 (1985). Seligman argues that the basis of the integrity
of the market policy is both historical and theoretical, citing to President Roosevelt's
statement at the time of passage of the 1933 securities bill, that by "putting the burden of
telling the whole truth on the seller," the proposed act "should give impetus to honest
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence."). "The assumption [was]
that investors [would] be more willing to purchase securities when compulsory disclosure of
material information reduce[ed] the incidence of fraud, increase[ed] the reliability of
estimates of firm value, and reduce[ed] the volatility of securities price swings .. " Id. at
1115.
62. Id. at 1118. Seligman suggests that mandatory disclosure will mean more rapid
dissemination of material information which will improve "allocative efficiency," in that
"[i]nformation on firms with promising probable future earnings will cause the prices of
these securities to rise; the market price for securities of firms whose earnings prospects are
less promising will decline." Id. at 1119. Thus, the market allocates its resources towards
investments with the greatest prospects. Id. Easterbrook asserts that the market price of
stock will not move unless other traders guess that insiders are trading based upon inside
information. Easterbrook, supra note 56, at 336.
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On the other hand, some argue that insider trading provides a
corrective function to the market's pricing mechanism; the market reacting
to trading, causing the price of shares gradually to reflect the information
that was not public. 63  The argument is that given that vast amounts of
information are almost instantaneously registered, the markets themselves
will provide an adequate price adjustment for any temporary informational
asymmetries that benefit insiders.64  However, significant empirical
evidence has shown that insider trading does not have a significant impact
on market prices.65
There is also the argument that that "if permitted to trade, insiders will
have an incentive to delay disclosures so as to increase their opportunities
to profit from the market's ignorance", thus harming outsiders who trade.66
As insiders will only trade stock when the market has either undervalued it
(for a purchase) or overvalued it (for a sale), 67 an innocent investor is
denied the profits he or she otherwise would have realized or become
poorer because she spends more than the stock is worth.68 Real concerns
about stock manipulation exist also. Management might be motivated to
make news about the company's stock through press releases and other
communications to cause movement in the stock price, then sell or buy at a
profit. Managers might also become more risk prone, knowing that inside
information will enable them to escape from the market to avoid losses in
63. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fishel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 868 (1983).
64. See MANNE, STOCK MARKETS, supra note 57; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REv. 547 (1970).
65. Seligman, supra note 61, at 1096. See also Lee, supra note 57, at 170 (discussing
how although the market receives information constantly, market prices do not reflect
"consensus" forecasts); Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REv. 549, 579 (1984).
66. Lee, supra note 57, at 160.
67. Lee, supra note 57.
68. Seligman, supra note 61, at 1098. Seligman gives the example of an insider who
knows that a mineral discovery will double the firm's stock price from $10.00 per share to
$20 per share.
If the insider buys stock at $10 per share from existing stockholder A, the
insider has not harmed A. Stockholder A was willing to sell at $10 per share in
any event. But potential stockholder B, who would have bought stockholder
A's shares at $10 per share, has been harmed . . . . At the least, potential
stockholder B must pay a higher price for other shares than the shares otherwise
would have commanded. At the most, potential stockholder B may find the
new price too high and may not purchase at all, thereby losing the profit he or
she otherwise would have enjoyed as the stock price rose from $10 to $20 per
share.
Id. at 1098. But Seligman's example is too narrow. Would shareholder A, even though
inclined to sell, have sold to the insider at $10, if she had the same information as the
insider? The rational seller would hold out for more.
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time.6 9 This may very well describe the goings on in Enron during its final
months when the board of directors deviated from its very strict ethics
policy regarding self-dealing transactions by allowing an executive to deal
with the company in off-book transactions that were a drain on company
revenues. ° Ken Lay, the chief executive officer, kept urging public
investment in the company's shares, all the while disposing of millions of
shares in his own accounts, not disclosing what he knew about the
underlying fraud and impending collapse.7'
The third rationale for the prohibition on insider trading, that is, to
protect the information rights of the corporation, has been debated on the
ground that state common law rules on theft and conversion are sufficient
to address the corporate business property concern. Also, it is said that
express provisions in employment and other written contracts could more
efficiently limit the use of such information by insiders. Indeed, some have
argued that insider trading should be allowed as a form of executive
compensation which encourages valuable entrepreneurial initiative.72
However it is not likely the case that insider information is the result of
entrepreneurial innovation as opposed to the fortuity of being an insider
and privy to valuable information.73
The debate over the merits of the prohibition of insider trading takes
on a wholly different dimension when it is asserted by employee-
shareholders that not all trading on the basis of material non-public
information should be prohibited, that is, they should be permitted to
dispose of company stock on this basis when necessary to safeguard their
pension plans funded primarily by company stock. They would extend the
rationale for not prohibiting trading in the absence of a duty, to not
prohibiting trading where there is a dual duty, such as that owed by a plan
fiduciary who is also a corporate insider privy to material non-public
information.
IV. ERISA AND FIDUCIARY DUTY TO PLAN PARTICIPANTS
In 1974, Congress adopted the Employee Retirement Income Security
69. Id. at 1095.
70. See Joel Seligman, Conflicts of Interests in Corporate and Securities Law: No One
Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 449,
453-54 (2002) (describing how losses from off-book transactions between Enron and a
company owned by an officer of Enron, resulted in the company's restatement of revenues
downward by billions of dollars).
71. See Elson & Gyves, supra note 3.
72. MANNE, STOCK MARKETS, supra note 57, at 132-41; Carlton & Fishchel, supra note
63, at 870.
73. Scott, supra note 55, at 808.
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Act,74 designed to regulate "employee investment, pension, and health
benefit plans by setting certain minimum standards for participation,
vesting, and funding, and imposing various fiduciary duties on those who
manage such plans., 75 Congress aimed to "protect and strengthen the rights
of employees, enforce uniform fiduciary standards, and encourage
employers to create and maintain benefit plans for employees. 76
A. Defined Contribution Plans and Defined Benefit Plans
There are two basic types of pension plans contemplated by ERISA:
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. Defined-benefit plans "pay
fixed or determinable benefits. . . to participants who retire at a certain
age. 77 The employer determines the amount of these benefits and sets
aside the necessary funds. 78 Under defined-contribution plans, on the other
hand, benefits depend on the contributions made by the employees,
earnings and matching contributions made by the employer.79
The trend in recent years had been for employers to offer defined
contribution plans and not defined-benefit plans.80 More than eighty
percent of all pension plans are defined contribution plans and they cover
more than sixty percent of all plan participants.8 This trend is remarkable
in that the two types of plans differ dramatically in their allocation of
investment risk between employee and employer. Under the defined-
benefit plan, the employer bears the risk that it will not have allocated
sufficient funds to make the promised payments or if those funds allocated
are invested in securities that lose value.82 In contrast, under a defined-
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1000-1461 (2006).
75. Levy v. Chandler, 287 F. Supp. 2d 831, 835 (E.D. Tenn. 2003); see Wright v.
Oregon Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004); 29 U.S.C. §1001, 1001(b)
(2006).
76. Levy, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
77. SEC Release No. 33-6188, 1980 WL 29482, at *6-7 (Feb. 1, 1980); 29 U.S.C. §
1002(35).
78. David Millon, Worker Ownership Through 401(k) Retirement Plans: Enron's
Cautionary Tale, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 835, 837 (2002); Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final
Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DUQ. L. REv. 69 (2002).
79. SEC Release No. 33-6188, 1980 WL 29482, at *6-7 (Feb. 1, 1980); 29 U.S.C. §
1002(34) (2006).
80. Id.; see Lorraine Schmall, Defined Contribution Plans After Enron, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 891, 905-06 (arguing that defined contribution plans should not be considered pension
plans because the real risks that investments will perform poorly negates a secure
retirement). Defined Benefit plans, but not defined contribution plans, are also insured by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency that steps in to pay a percentage
of private benefits when the plans terminate the pension with insufficient assets. Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation, http://www.pbgc.gov (last visited July 7, 2007).
81. Millon, supra note 78, at 838.
82. Id. See SEC Release No. 33-6188, 1980 WL 29482, at *6-7 (Feb. 1, 1980).
2007]
846 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:4
contribution plan, the employee who directs investments, will realize
benefits based upon the value created by those investment choices.83
Typically, under the defined contribution plan, the employees choose
from among various mutual funds and other investment choices offered by
the employer, which can include the employer's own stock. The
employer's matching contribution can and is often in the form of company
stock and under many such plans, this is the only option available.84 These
plans typically preclude employees from selling company stock to reinvest
the proceeds until she reaches a stated age, most commonly fifty, fifty-five,
or sixty." In consequence, many defined contribution plans are heavily
invested in company stock, nearly forty-two percent. 86  At Enron, that
percentage approached two-thirds.87 This is because diversification is not
required under ERISA for defined-contribution plans, (although it is
required for defined benefit plans where the investment portfolio may not
hold more than ten percent of its value in company stock).88 Indeed, with
Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs"), which are funded solely by
company stock, Congress sought to develop plans that would function as
both an "'employee retirement benefit plan and a technique of corporate
finance' that would encourage employee ownership of a company.
', 89
While the employer's stock represents a large percentage of the employee's
pension plan, the same investment represents only a small percentage of the
company's total outstanding shares-at Enron only two percent-meaning
that employees have little or no power within the corporation by virtue of
shareholder status. 90
B. Fiduciaries Under ERISA
ERISA imposes personal liability upon pension plan fiduciaries for
83. Millon, supra note 78, at 838.
84. Id. at 839. At Enron, the defined contribution plans provided that the employer's
contribution "should be" or "at all times will be primarily in shares of" company stock. In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & "ERISA" Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 549 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
That stock could not be traded until the employee reached age 50. Millon, supra note 78, at
839; Schmall, supra note 80 at 894 n. 10.
85. Reece, supra note 1, at 94.
86. Millon, supra note 78, at 839 (citing Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive
Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Savings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 79, 90
(2001)).
87. Id. at 839 (citing Patrick J. Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in
Retirement Plans, at 3 (CRS Report for Congress) (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.house.gov/boosman/issues/crsrsenron.pdf); Reece, supra note 1, at 92.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2006).
89. Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1457 (6th Cir. 1995).
90. Millon, supra note 78, at 842.
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violations of their duties to plan participants.9' Determining who is a
fiduciary is often not a simple matter of looking to a person's title. It is
generally held that an individual is not held liable as a fiduciary under
ERISA merely because that individual is also director, officer, shareholder
or manager of the corporate employer.92 Rather, the "'threshold question'.
• . is whether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, performing a
fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to complaint." 93
A fiduciary may be either a named fiduciary or a defacto fiduciary. A
named fiduciary is one "named in the plan instrument, or ... is identified
as a fiduciary by the employer or employee organization," acting either
separately or jointly.94 Typically, the employer, its board of directors and
chief executive officer will be named fiduciaries with power of
management and investment over plan assets. As this language shows,
under ERISA, a fiduciary need not be an independent party. 95
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006) (stating that a fiduciary shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach); see also 29
U.S.C. § 1103(a); 1102(a)(l) (requiring pension funds to be held in trust).
92. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises
Inc., 793 F.2d 1460 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Dynergy, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 309 F. Supp. 2d
861, 899 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, No. 3:00-778-
17, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343, *17-18. (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001) (where authority to make
investment decisions as to employer-matching contributions was vested in the plan
committee, board defendants not liable for those decisions). A corporation and its board
may wear "two hats": that of employer and of ERISA fiduciary. "ERISA liability arises
only from actions taken or duties breached in the performance of ERISA obligations." In re
Worldcom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding member of board of
company, which was the plan administrator with the power to appoint individuals, including
"any" Worldcom officer as fiduciary were not fiduciaries by virtue of their powers under
state law to manage the corporation); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225-26 (2000)
(administrator "is fiduciary only 'to extent' that he acts in such a capacity"). This enables
courts to avoid the conceptual difficulties in imposing personal liability in such instances
where the corporation can only act through its officers; that they are not liable solely by
virtue of holding office. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & "ERISA" Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d
511, 567 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 34, 37 (3d
Cir. 1991)) ("when an ERISA plan names a corporation as a fiduciary, the officers who
exercise discretion on behalf of the corporation are not fiduciaries within the meaning of
[ERISA] unless it can be shown that these officers have individual discretionary roles as to
plan administration."); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, at D-5 (1991)).
93. Edgar v. Avaya, No. Civ.A. 05-3598 SRC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23151, *12 (D.
N.J. April 24, 2006).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
95. Employers typically name other persons or committees to see to the day to day
activities of the administration of the plan, such as a plan administrator or administration
committee (made up of members of the employer's board of directors) and an investment
committee (usually appointed by the employer). Usually, there is a plan Trustee with direct
management, investment and disposition powers over the plan's assets. The power to
appoint, retain, or remove the trustee typically resides in the named fiduciary. ERISA
provides a safe harbor from liability for a named fiduciary to the extent he has allocated or
designated his fiduciary responsibilities to another. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(2). However,
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A de facto fiduciary is one by virtue of her "functional authority and
control relative to the plan, 96 i.e., she "exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan...
[over the] disposition of its assets," "renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation" or "has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan." 9  Under this broad
definition, "'a person is a fiduciary only with respect to those aspects of the
plan over which he exercises authority or control. "' 9' However, where a
person actually exercises any authority or control over the management or
disposition of the assets of the plan, formal or delegated discretion to do so
is not required for a finding that that person is a fiduciary. 99
this appointment power carries a duty to monitor to "ensure that the [ ] [appointees']
performance has been in compliance with ... the statutory standards, and satisfies the needs
of the plan." In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 553, n.59 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-78, at
FR-17); Electronic Data Systems Corp. "ERISA" Litigation, 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 670 (E.D.
Tex. 2004) (finding that a duty to monitor appointees by fiduciaries with appointment power
is imposed by ERISA); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 135 (7th Cir. 1984) (those fiduciaries
responsible for selecting and retaining the plan administrators "had a duty to monitor
appropriately the administrators' actions"); In re Westar Energy, Inc. ERISA Litig., 2005
U.S. LEXIS 28585, *25, 30-31 (D. Kan. September 29, 2005) (liability for continuing
allocation to persons that named fiduciary knew or should have known were not qualified to
"loyally and prudently manage the plan's assets" who engaged in risky activities).
A directed trustee is one who is required to invest funds and follow in every material respect
directions given to him by the plan administrator. 29 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1). However,
information known or should have been known to the directed trustee should prompt him to
reject those directions. Worldcom, 263 F. Supp.2d at 755-56, 758, 765.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (21)(A) (2006); In re XCel Energy, Inc. Securities Derivative &
ERISA Litigation, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Minn. 2004); see also Mertens v. Hewitt
Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (describing ways persons can be declared fiduciaries even
without the typical title of a fiduciary).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
98. Bannistor v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sommers Drug
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1459-60
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1034 (1987)); Electronic Data Systems "ERISA "
Litigation, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 665; In re Williams Companies ERISA Litigation, 271 F.
Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
99. Electronic Data Systems ERISA Litigation, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 666-67, 668 (persons
having ultimate decision-making authority as to all fiduciary functions; those with authority
to appoint with final review over actions taken, and those with authority over day to day
administration, could be functional fiduciaries); In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 544; see
also FirsTier Bank, N.A. v. Zeller, 16 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1994) (fiduciary duty arises
where from exercise of discretionary authority or control over plan management, and also
when dealing with plan assets), cert. denied sub nom. Vercoe v. FirsTier Bank, N.A., 513
U.S. 871 (1994).
99. Electronic Data Systems, ERISA Litigation, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 671; Martin v.
Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 553, 661.
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C. The Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA
Under Section 1104(a)(1) of ERISA, a pension plan fiduciary must:
"discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries" for the purpose of providing benefits to the
beneficiaries.' 00 These duties include the duty to act prudently, to follow
directives, to monitor, to diversify, to act with loyalty and to disclose. This
list does not purport to be an exhaustive one. Instead, Congress expected
the courts to engraft the common law of trusts upon ERISA to define the
general scope of fiduciary authority and responsibility.' 0 1 In determining
the relevant scope of the fiduciary duty, courts endeavor to balance the
competing congressional purposes: on the one hand, Congress desired to
"offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, and on the other,"
Congress desired "not to create a system that is so complex that
administrative costs and litigation expen'ses unduly discourage employers"
from creating pension plans.'0 2 Yet, courts have held that plan trustees
have fiduciary duties that are the "highest known in the law.'
0 3
1. The Duty to Act Prudently
Fiduciaries must act "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
to participants" and "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing" that a prudent man would exercise under
like circumstances and "in accordance with ... the plan."'1 4 Whether a
fiduciary meets this standard is an objective test, with consideration given
to whether the fiduciary "utilized proper methods to investigate, evaluate
and structure the investment" and "exercised independent judgment."' 5
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
101. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pp.
3-5, 11-13 (1973)); 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974, Committee Print Compiled for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Library of Congress, Ser. No. 93-406,
pp. 2350-2352, 2358-2360 (1976); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 255, p. 343 (rev. 2d ed. 1992).
102. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496.
103. Flanigan v. General Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001).
104. 29 U.S.C.A.§ 1104(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
105. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (quoting Laborers National Pension Fund v.
Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied
528 U.S. 967 (1999)). Department of Labor Regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b),
offers guidelines as to when requirements are satisfied, including having
"appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that, . . . are relevant
to the particular investment or investment course of action, including the role
[it] plays in that portion of the plan's investment portfolio ...." Whether "the
particular investment or investment course of action is reasonably designed ..."
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The test is one of conduct, not an assessment of performance of the
investments. 0 6 To hold a fiduciary liable, it must be shown that had an
investigation been conducted, the improvidence of the investment would
have been made known.1
0 7
2. The Duty to Diversify
ERISA specifies that plan investments must be diversified unless it is
clearly prudent not to diversify.'0 8 However, as stated earlier, there is an
exception for ESOPs, where ownership of company stock is a principal
purpose of the plan. In such cases, fiduciaries are generally not obligated
to diversify unless the failure to diversify would not be in the interests of
the plan participants.'0 9  Thus, there is a presumption that continued
investment in the company's stock is proper. To rebut the presumption, a
plan participant must show that the fiduciary "could not reasonably believe
that the plan's drafters would have intended under the circumstances that
he continue to comply with the ESOP's direction that he invest exclusively
in employer securities."" 0 This requires a showing of more than a mere
"to further the purposes of the plan .... consider[ing] the risk of loss and the
opportunity for gain (or other return) ......
Consideration of the extent to which the "portfolio" is diversiflied] . .
"[t]he [1]iquidity and current return of the portfolio[,]... the projected return of
the portfolio ......
Hence, "because opportunities [are necessarily foregone], an investment will not be prudent
if it would be expected to provide a plan with a lower rate of return than available
alternative investments with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier than alternative
available investment with commensurate rates of return." Interpretive Bulletin, Dep't of
Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1.
106. In Re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. Northern
Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d at 317.
107. Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1460 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Barker v. Am. Mobil
Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995) (ERISA fiduciary has duty to investigate
suspicion he has with respect to plan funding and maintenance); In re Dynergy, Inc. ERISA
Litigation, 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 889 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (complaint failed to allege sufficient
facts to show investigation would have revealed company's financial improprieties).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). ERISA's duty to diversify, however, is not measured by
hard and fast rules or formulas. Instead, Congress recognized that the degree of investment
concentration will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Among the
considerations are: "the purposes of the plan"; "the amount of the plan assets"; "financial
and industrial conditions"; "the type of investment", e.g., "mortgages, bonds or shares of
stock ... "; "distribution as to industries"; "the dates of maturity." H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5038, 5085.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
110. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d at 553, 570, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper, 66 F.3d at
1459 (6th Cir. 1995); In Re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 534; Hill v. BellSouth, 313 F. Supp.
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
decline in the value of the asset, but- in some courts, a showing of a
"precipitous decline in the employer's stock [along with] evidence that the
company is on the brink of collapse or [] undergoing serious
mismanagement."'' . Some courts hold that where a plan's documents
require the employer match to be made in company stock, a fiduciary
cannot be liable for not diversifying investments.12 However, other courts
hold the contrary, that a plan cannot include a per se prohibition against
diversification, for that would cause the fiduciary to violate the main
command of ERISA, that fiduciaries act solely in the best interest of
beneficiaries.'
A fiduciary may be absolved of liability if the assets are not
diversified where a plan participant's exercise of individual control over
the assets of an individual account resulted in a loss."1
4
2d 1361, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
111. Lalonde v. Textron, 369 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004); Moench, 62 F.3d at 572; Kuper,
66 F.3d at 1460; Wright v. Oregon Mettalurgical Corporation, 360 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (9th
Cir. 2004) (declining to adopt expressly the Moench and Kuper standards, but finding on
facts, that plaintiff's complaint failed to show company's financial condition was seriously
deteriorating to rebut the presumption; also noting "genuine risk of insider self-dealing" if
information was disclosed).
112. See, e.g., In re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 896 (fiduciary not
liable for "failing to comply with plan by refusing to direct the diversification of employer
matching grants out of employer stock or into diversified investments"); In re McKesson
HBOC, Inc. ERISA Lit., No. COO-2003ORMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473, at *13-14,
*17 (N.C. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002) (plan required all matching contributions to be in company
stock and defendant fiduciary had no discretion as to form of employer contribution,
particularly where plaintiffs failed to show a causal link, i.e., "that an adequate investigation
would have revealed to a reasonable fiduciary that the investment at issue was
improvident.")
113. See, e.g., Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1457; In re Enron Corp, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 534; Hill,
313 F. Supp. 2d at 1367, 1368.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B). However, Section 1104(c) does not provide an
automatic exemption. The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations on this issue.
The regulations require that to qualify, the plan must inform the participants that the plan is
intended as a plan under Section 1104(c) of ERISA and that "fiduciaries... may be relieved
of liability for any losses which are the direct and necessary result of investment instructions
given by such participant or beneficiary." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(i). The
plan must also allow participants the opportunity to "exercise control over assets" and to
choose from a "broad range of investment alternatives," how assets are invested. Id. at
§2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(i). In exercising control, the participant must be afforded an
opportunity to give investment instruction with appropriate frequency and "obtain sufficient
information to make informed investment decisions." Id. at § 2550.404c-1(b). See also In
re Unisys Sav. Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 440, 447-48 (3d Cir. 1996) (evidence failed to
show that the plan participants were given sufficient information to ascertain the breadth of
actual plan investments or to assess all of the investment alternatives available and thus
there were significant restrictions on the ability to make transfers); In re Enron, 284 F.
Supp. 2d. at 577 (concealment of material non-public facts about the company's financial
condition meant plan did not qualify as an 1104(c) plan).
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3. Duty of Loyalty
Perhaps "[t]he most fundamental duty of ERISA plan fiduciaries is a
duty of complete loyalty""' 5 requiring "fiduciaries [to] discharge their
duties 'solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries,' and to
'exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the interests of third
persons."" 16 This duty has its source in the common law of trusts., 7
The duty of loyalty is compromised, to an extent, by the "two hat"
rule, under which an employer-fiduciary may act as both a fiduciary to an
ERISA plan and as an employer or other officer with an obligation to the
company. In these dual roles, employers are permitted to act in accordance
with their interests as employers, even when adverse to the interests of the
beneficiaries, so long as they are not at the time acting as an ERISA
fiduciary. Thus, pure business decisions (such as amending or terminating
a plan) by an ERISA employer are not governed by a duty of prudence or a
loyalty requirement." 8
Significantly, for our purposes here, the decision to provide a
company stock fund as an investment option or to make contributions to
employees' retirement funds with company stock are held to be decisions
made in a fiduciary capacity, rather than business decisions." 9
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
116. In re Enron Corp, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 546-47.
117. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000) (quoting Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985))
("[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other
fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their
authority and responsibilities").
118. Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1456; In re CMS Energy ERISA Litigation, 312 F. Supp. 2d 898,
911 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Similarly, decisions characterized as settlor functions as to the form
or structure of the plan such as entitlement to, calculation and amounts of benefits; whether
plan participants can direct the plan's fiduciaries to purchase company stock; imposing age
and other restrictions on the ability of the participants to direct the plan's fiduciaries to
transfer plan assets out of company stock, do not trigger fiduciary duties. Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 442, 444-445 (1999); see also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226
("[S]pecific payout detail of the [ERISA] plan was, of course a feature that the employer as
plan sponsor was free to adopt without breach of any fiduciary duty under ERISA, since an
employer's decisions about the content of a plan are not themselves fiduciary acts.");
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) ("Nothing in ERISA requires employers
to establish pension plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers must
provide if they chose to have such a plan."); Smith v. Contini, 205 F.3d 597, 602 (3d Cir.
2000) ("We start our discussion of the issues by recognizing that ERISA neither mandates
the creation of pension plans nor in general dictates the benefits to be afforded once a plan is
created."). Thus, an employer-sponsor of a pension plan can fire an employee for reasons
not related to the ERISA plan or can modify the terms of a plan to be less generous to the
beneficiary.
119. In re CMS Energy, 312 F.Supp.2d at 911; see also In re Westar Energy, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28585 at *65-66 (where defendants had discretionary authority to eliminate
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
a. The Duty to Disclose
The extent to which a plan administrator must make disclosure to plan
participants apart from the formal disclosures expressly required by
ERISA 20 is an unsettled issue, but is generally viewed as being informed
by the common law.' 2 1 Indeed, the duty to disclose under ERISA has been
described as an "area of developing and controversial law.' ' 2 2 The duty to
disclose has also been stated as "a constant thread in the relationship
between beneficiary and trustee; entail[ing] not only a negative duty not to
misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows
that silence might be harmful." '123
This enlarged duty is based upon a recognition that the disparity of
expertise and knowledge between the lay beneficiary and the trained
fiduciary, requires reliance by the beneficiary on the fiduciary.) 4 Thus, a
fiduciary has a duty to disclose when there are "material facts affecting the
interest of the beneficiary which [the fiduciary] knows the beneficiary does
company stock as an investment option, decision not to, was not a business decision outside
of ERISA fiduciary duties). But see Xcel Energy, Inc., Sec., Deriv. & "ERISA" Lit., 312 F.
Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Minn. 2004) (holding that part of plan requiring employer matching
contributions to be in company stock was a plan design decision).
120. ERISA expressly requires plan administrators to make certain information available
to plan participants, including a summary plan description, certain annual and
supplementary reports, and a statement of accrued benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1026
(2006).
121. See Bd. of Trs. of the CWA/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d
139, 143-46 (2d Cir. 1997). Courts have relied on the legislative history that "the principles
of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate
for employee benefit plans." H.R. REP. No. 93-533 at 12-13 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650-51.
122. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 555. It is well-settled in the common law that
a fiduciary may not materially mislead those to whom fiduciary duties are owed. Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996); In re Xcel Energy Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1176;
Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 425 (5th Cir. 2003) ("When an ERISA plan
administrator speaks in its fiduciary capacity concerning a material aspect of the plan, it
must speak truthfully"); McCall v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co., 237 F.3d 506, 510-11
(2000); Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994) ("plan administrator may not
make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants"); In re Dynergy, Inc.
ERISA Litigation, 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 886 (S.D. Tex. 2004); In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 440 ;
In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit ERISA Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255, 1261 (3d Cir.
1995).
123. Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1300 (3d Cir. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959), noted
in Watson v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114 (1st Cir. 2002); Griggs v. E.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 380-81 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Adams v.
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 2000); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 226 F.3d 575, 590 (7th Cir. 2000); Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 547-
48 (6th Cir. 1999).
124. In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 441.
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not know, but needs to know for his protection,"'25 even in the absence of a
specific request for information, where the participant has "no reason to
suspect that it should make inquiry into what may appear to be a routine
matter.
l a6
Some courts have limited the duty of affirmative disclosure to
circumstances where the information would have an "extreme impact" on
plan beneficiaries. 7  It seems that most of the cases confronting the
conflict of duty by the ERISA fiduciary/insider, have involved this kind of
information, yet these cases conflict as to whether a duty of disclosure
arises, regardless of what the plan participant is privileged to do with the
information.
V. IRRECONCILABLE DECISIONS FROM THE COURTS ON AN
IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT
Where an ERISA fiduciary is privy to material non-public information
about the company's health, do the general duties of prudence and loyalty
require the fiduciary to advise plan participants about the wisdom of
investing in company stock in light of this non-public information? As
stated earlier, the decision whether to fund the matching contributions with
company stock is not a business decision, but one requiring fiduciary
concerns. Would such disclosure, if plan participants act to divest these
holdings, amount to prohibited insider trading? Is the ERISA fiduciary an
insider for purposes of the securities laws?
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
126. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (quoting Glaziers and Glassworkers
Union Local No. 225 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities, Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1181 (3d
Cir.1996)); see also Griggs, 237 F.3d at 371; Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 189 F.3d 929, 939
(1999) (disclosure whether or not information is asked for); Anweiler v. Am.Elec. Power
Svc. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993); Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat. Pension
Fund, 128 F.3d 541, 546-47 (7th Cir. 1997) (disclosures where silence could be misleading);
Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 480, 492 (3d Cir. 2000); Eddy v. Colonial
Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (advice required on circumstances that
threaten the beneficiary's interests). Some courts, however, refuse to read an additional
disclosure obligation beyond those stated in ERISA into the fiduciary duty provisions
because ERISA deliberately defined fiduciary and disclosure obligations in separate sections
of the statute. See Bd. of Trs. of the CWA/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107
F.3d at 147 (Congress's deliberate structure of required disclosure limits kinds of documents
to be disclosed); Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996) (general
disclosure duty not recognized); Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987)
("[A]n administrator who complies with the statutory standard for disclosure cannot be said
to have breached the fiduciary duty by not providing earlier disclosure"); Ehlmann v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 2002) (no general duty to disclose
beyond specific disclosure provisions of ERISA).
127. Hill v. Bellsouth, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (noting cases
requiring a special circumstance to trigger heightened disclosure obligation).
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
In Dirks v. SEC,128 the Supreme Court explained that persons who are
not traditional insiders of corporations, such as accountants, lawyers and
advisers, who become privy to corporate information on a confidential
basis, may be regarded as insiders for purposes of insider trading
prohibitions. 29 An ERISA fiduciary who is the chief executive officer, a
member of the board of directors or other high officer, such as a director of
benefits, would seem to fall within this meaning and therefore may be
limited to making disclosures for legitimate corporate purposes only.
Would disclosure by this ERISA fiduciary of what a plan participant
"needs to know for his protection" be a legitimate corporate purpose? It is
arguably so, where the insider undertakes to act in a fiduciary capacity. If
it is, then under Dirks, plan participants would not be liable as tippees for
their divestment. If insiders, who are ERISA fiduciaries, may not
legitimately make these discreet disclosures, then there would be prohibited
insider trading.
While some courts have found no general duty to communicate what
is clearly material information affecting the plan participants' interests,
finding such a duty constrained by the prohibitions on insider trading,
30
other courts have found that there is a duty to disclose both to the plan
participants and to the public if the disclosure to plan participants would
result in divestment of company stock.' 3' The case law to date provides
little guidance as to the rightful and least harmful course for the fiduciary to
take.
A. No Breach of Duty to Act Prudently or to Disclose
In Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corporations,'32 plaintiffs were
participants in the company's 401(k) retirement savings plan.'33 They
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the plan fiduciaries for misinforming
them and failing to obtain and provide accurate information related to the
corporation's value. 3 4 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged, the failure to give
128. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
129. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, n. 14.
130. See cases discussed, infra at text accompanying notes 132 to 153.
131. See cases discussed, infra at text accompanying notes 154 to 247.
132. No. 3:00-778-17, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
133. Id. at *4-5. Employees contributed a percentage of their salary to their individual
accounts and they decided how these funds would be invested. The employer matched
some of the employee contributions in company stock; these matching funds did not,
however, vest immediately and the employee lacked control over the funds until they did.
Id. A committee of three individuals appointed by the board made the investment decisions
as to the non-vested employer-matching funds. Id. at *5. The Plan empowered the Board of
Directors to appoint and remove members of the committee, but provided that the "Board
shall have no other responsibilities with respect to the plan." Id. at * 18.
134. Id. at *4-5.
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accurate information caused the plan to continue to purchase and retain
company stock as employer-matching contributions to the plan, at a time
when the share price was overvalued. 135 As the corporation continued to
contribute company stock, the price dropped sharply after certain negative
information was released to the general public.
136
The court refused to read into the language creating the board's
authority over the plan, a requirement that the corporation keep the plan
committee "informed of what [could] only be characterized as 'inside
information' for use in the making of its investment decisions."' 3 7 The
court found no general fiduciary duty to disclose owed by the employer to
the plan and dismissed the claims accordingly.'
In essence, the court found that plaintiff sought to hold the Plan
Committee defendants liable under a standard which would
put the Committee in the untenable position of choosing one of
three unacceptable (and in some instances illegal) courses of
action: (1) obtain 'inside' information and then make stock
purchase and retention decisions based on this 'inside'
information; (2) make the disclosures of 'inside' information
before acting on the discovered information, overstepping its
role, and in any case, likely causing the stock price to drop; or (3)
breach its fiduciary duty by not obtaining and acting on 'inside'
information. 139
The court did not decide whether plaintiffs assertion that at least the
decision to refrain from additional purchases of company stock would not
violate securities laws, although in the court's view, "plaintiffs theory,
would, nonetheless violate the spirit of [those] laws, and at the least,
impose a higher standard on ERISA fiduciaries as to Plan purchases of
employer stock than would be applied to other stock purchases.' ' 40 But,
ERISA itself imposes these "higher" duties upon plan fiduciaries-they
must "act for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to plan
participants,"' 4' with "care and skill"; 42 they must evaluate whether a
"particular investment course of action is reasonably designed... to further
the purposes of the plan," consider "the risk of loss", as well as the
"opportunity for gain.' 43 These higher duties would seem to call for, at the
very least, that a new investment course of action be adopted.
135. Id. at *5-6.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *22.
138. Id. at*17.
139. Id. at *26.
140. Id. at *26-27.
141. See text accompanying notes 100 to 104, supra.
142. See text accompanying note 105, supra.
143. See text accompanying note 105, supra.
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
In In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litigation,144 plaintiffs were
participants in the companies' (McKesson and HBOC) two pension
plans. 145  They made similar allegations against both McKesson and
HBOC, essentially that they breached their fiduciary duties by establishing
and maintaining an investment plan which required that all (at least as it
pertained to McKesson) employer contributions be made in company stock;
by continuing to maintain substantial portions of the plans' assets in
company stock when they were aware of financial and accounting
misdeeds which could result in a lower stock value; providing untruthful
information regarding HBOC's financial state; and by failing to monitor
the decisions of the investment committee. 1
46
The complaint, where it asserted breach of fiduciary duty by the
failure to divest the plan of the company stock, was insufficient. The
defendants argued, and the court accepted, that "they could not have sold
company stock without disclosing the financial improprieties," thereby
violating insider trading laws. Moreover, a public disclosure of the
information prior to trading in the stock would itself have prompted the
same sharp drop in stock value. 47  The court stated that "[n]ot even a
fiduciary acting in its fiduciary capacity is permitted to engage in insider
trading;"' 48 that "[fliduciaries are not obligated to violate the securities laws
in order to satisfy their fiduciary duties."'149 This court conceived of the
issue as one of causation as opposed to substantive misconduct, and ruled
that "even if the defendants breached a fiduciary duty by failing to divest
the plan of McKesson stock after the merger, plaintiffs ha[d] not alleged
sufficient facts to establish that any damages were caused by such
144. No. COO-20030RMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002).
145. Id. Before the merger of McKesson and HBOC, they each maintained employee
pension plans. The McKesson plan was a 401(k) and Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP"). Id. at *4. Participating employees contributed deferred compensation and the
employer made matching contributions, in the form of company stock or cash, at the
company's election, but cash contributions were required "to be converted to company stock
as soon as practicable." Id. at *4. The HBOC plan provided for employee contributions and
matching contributions by the employer. However, unlike the McKesson plan, employees
had the right to determine how the funds would be invested, selecting among seven different
funds, including the HBOC company stock fund. Id. at *5.
146. Id. at *7, *11, *41. After the companies merged, McKesson publicly announced
that the company had engaged in improper and illegal accounting practices, had materially
misrepresented the financial condition of the company and the financial results would be
restated downward. As a result, the Company's stock price dropped sharply in value with a
consequent rapid decline in the value of the assets held in the McKesson Plan, by more than
$800 million. Id. at *5-6.
147. Id. at *20.
148. Id. at*21.
149. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 166 cmt. a (1965)) (holding
that a trustee is not under a duty to the beneficiary to do an act which is criminal or tortious).
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breach.'
°50
In other words, this court believed that the fiduciary can remain silent,
indeed conceal from his beneficiary, facts and circumstances detrimental to
the plan's assets, leaving the beneficiary in the dark to continue at his
peril.'15  However, unlike the Hull case, this court treated the decision to
divest differently from the way it treated the decision to continue to invest
in company stock. The court granted plaintiffs' leave to amend the
complaint to include an allegation that the fiduciaries breached their duties
and abused their discretion, despite a presumption against diversification
(because the plan was an ESOP), in not deviating from the McKesson Plan
by continuing to make contributions in the form of company stock, where
the facts showed questionable accounting practices which would affect the
value of company stock. 52 Would there nonetheless be "communicative
content" in a decision by the company to cease matching contributions in
stock, and replace them with cash? Would this be a signal to the
beneficiary to divest existing holdings? Would the beneficiary have to
disclose to her purchaser the change in policy, even though she does not
know the basis for it?
53
B. Duty to Disclose Consistent With Insider Trading Laws
In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & "ERISA"
150. Id. Still, plaintiffs argued that the fiduciaries had options other than violating the
insider trading rules that could have averted the loss to the plan, including selling the stock
back to the company in a private transaction; "seeking an independent assessment from a
financial or legal advisor or resign[ing] in favor of an independent fiduciary, or seeking
judicial guidance if the only apparent option for preserving the trust was to deviate from the
terms of the trust itself"; or seeking insurance against the loss. Id. at *21-22. The court
rejected each of these alternative proposed courses of action as unpersuasive, accepting the
defendants' arguments that retaining independent counsel or an outside fiduciary after
learning of the accounting problems would not have avoided that loss, since an independent
fiduciary would have been constrained by the same securities law prohibitions that worked
against McKesson. Id. at *22. "[R]epurchasing the McKesson stock at the inflated pre-
disclosure trading levels . . .would have shifted the loss to McKesson's other public
shareholders", and it was not certain that the company would have agreed to such a
transaction. Id. Nor would insurance have protected the plaintiffs, since the fiduciaries
would have been obligated to disclose the accounting irregularities or be liable for insurance
fraud. Id. The court found no lawful action that could have been taken to avoid the
subsequent loss that occurred after the public disclosure of the accounting problems. Id. at
*23.
151. Id. at *21.
152. Id. at *26-27.
153. Accord Edgar v. Avaya, No. Civ.A. 05-3598 SRC, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 23151
(D.N.J. April 24, 2006) (divesting plans of company stock prior to disclosure of adverse
information would be in violation of federal securities laws: "[n]ot even a fiduciary acting
in its fiduciary capacity is permitted to engage in insider trading.").
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
Litigation5 4 took an entirely different position from those taken in Hull and
McKesson. Here, the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that
defendants breached their fiduciary and co-fiduciary duties of prudence,
care, and loyalty under ERISA essentially, by (1) "causing, inducing and
allowing" investments to be made in Enron stock, when it had material
information showing the company was in financial trouble, which would
caution against such investments and (2) by failing to disclose those
material facts to plan participants.'
The first of these allegations suggests two broad questions. Did the
defendants fail to exercise independent judgment in not evaluating material
information in determining whether to match employee contributions in
employer stock despite plan directives? Did they have some discretion in
continuing to fund the plan in company stock?'5 6 The court answered yes
to both, finding that an ERISA fiduciary has the duty to follow the
documents and instruments governing the plan, but only to the extent that
the documents and instruments are consistent with ERISA.1 7 Where the
two-the provisions of the ERISA policies (i.e., to protect plan assets) and
the stated guidelines of the plan-conflict, those of ERISA must be
followed.'58
As to the second allegation, the question is: did the fiduciaries here
breach their duties when they failed to make disclosures to plan participants
which were material to a determination of the safety of the plan assets?
The court repeated what other courts had said, that the trustee is under a
duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts "affecting the interest
of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know of and
which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection,"'5 9 whether or not
the beneficiary asks. 160  Here, not only did the defendants fail to make
disclosures about this kind of material information (fraudulent accounting,
deceitful business practices, the company's "precarious, swiftly
deteriorating financial condition"), it also made knowing
misrepresentations "intended to induce the plan participants' continued...
154. 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Texas 2003). There were five classes of defendants: (1)
certain directors and officers of the corporation; (2) committees, trustees, and individuals
that administered the three pension plans; (3) the company's accountant, Arthur Andersen,
LLP, and some of its partners and employees; (4) the company's outside law firm and some
of its partners; and (5) five investment banks. The complaint pleaded causes of action under
ERISA, RICO, state common law negligence and civil conspiracy. Id. at 531.
155. Id. at 533, 537.
156. Id. at 548.
157. Id. at 549.
158. Id. In any such case, the court ruled, this kind of determination is not properly
made on a motion to dismiss, but rather is only appropriate upon the development of a
factual record after discovery. Id. at 534.
159. See id. at 557; see also cases cited supra note 126.
160. Id.
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purchase and holding of Enron stock .... ,,16 All the while, certain
individuals, including the chief executive officer, Ken Lay, were selling
large amounts of Enron stock based on the same information. 62 On these
two bases, defendants breached those standards required of fiduciaries.
Defendants responded by stating that if fulfilling their duties required
selective disclosure only to the plan participants of material, non-public
information about accounting irregularities and financial improprieties-so
that the participants could decide to discontinue the purchase of additional
shares or to divest their holdings of Enron stock before a public disclosure,
they would be violating insider trading prohibitions under the federal
securities laws. 63 The court stated:
[i]f a plan fiduciary were to tell plan participants of Enron's
actual financial condition so they could sell at a high price based
on this nonpublic information, he would also be violating insider
trading laws and he, the plan participants as 'tippees,' and the
Administrative Committee might be found liable for securities
law violations.'64
However, this did not excuse defendants from liability under ERISA.
The court refused to follow either Hull v. Policy Management Systems
Corp. 165 or In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litigation,166 attempting to
distinguish McKesson on the basis that the ruling there applied to ESOP
plans, which by their nature are generally exempt from the duty to diversify
and on its face not applicable to the 401(k) plans at issue in Enron.
167
However, this was not a valid distinction because one of the plans in Enron
was an ESOP; in which case, although there is a presumption that
investment in company stock is prudent, the presumption is rebutted by a
showing that the failure to diversify was not in the interests of the plan
participants.'6 8 The court eventually dismissed McKesson as misguided,
finding the defendant's argument there to essentially be an argument that
the fiduciary should both breach his duty under ERISA and, in
violation of the securities laws, become part of the alleged
fraudulent scheme to conceal Enron's financial condition to the
detriment of current and prospective Enron shareholders, which
include the plan's participants. . . . [t]he statutes should be
interpreted to require that persons follow laws, not undermine
them. They should be construed not to cancel out the disclosure
161. Id. at 562.
162. Id. at 562-63.
163. In reEnron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
164. Id. at 564.
165. No. 3:00-778-17, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
166. No. C00-20030RMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002).
167. In reEnron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(2).
To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE?
obligations under both statutes or to mandate concealment, which
would only serve to make the harm more widespread; the statutes
should be construed to require, as they do, disclosure by Enron
officials and plan fiduciaries of Enron's concealed, material
financial status to the investing public generally, including plan
participants, whether 'impractical' or not, because continued
silence and deceit would onl, encourage the alleged fraud and
increase the extent of injury.'
6
Moreover, the court found that:
a fiduciary's duty of loyalty should also not be construed to
require him to enable and encourage plan participants to violate
the law, i.e., to sell their stock at artificially high prices to make a
profit or avoid loss before disclosure of Enron's financial
condition was made public." 0
The court seemed to believe that the ERISA fiduciary's duty to
disclose would encompass such material inside information, suggesting that
the plan assets are threatened by continuing the existing investment course
of action, but that the insider trading laws preclude the plan participants
from using the information to trade without public disclosure. However,
this would only be the case if these plan participants owed duties to other
shareholders or to the corporation (Chiarella),'' or if they received the
information from someone with such a duty who disclosed it improperly
(Dirks). 7 2  However, in Dirks, disclosure by an insider for purposes of
169. In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 565. The court believed that any damage suffered
by plan participants as a result of a drop in price before they could make a profit or avoid a
loss "would not be the fault of the plan fiduciary but of the underlying alleged fraudulent
Ponzi scheme, and the corporate officials who participated in it." IM.
170. Id. The court concluded, "A trustee has no duty to violate the law to serve its
beneficiaries." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 166, cmt. a). Indeed, the
court explained, an ERISA fiduciary cannot be held liable as an insurer of the value of plan
assets, even where the value is reduced as a result of fraud or manipulation; rather, a
fiduciary only has a duty to satisfy the prudent man rule, which provides immunity from
liability if the fiduciary "performs the necessary investigations and provides accurate
information in accordance with it." Id. at 565-66. The court placed reliance upon the
Department of Labor's interpretation of ERISA and its interface with the securities laws,
which rejected the McKesson court's interpretation. The Department of Labor, in an amicus
curiae brief, suggested practical ways to resolve the alleged tension between ERISA and the
federal securities statutes: (1) disclosure of "the information to other shareholders and the
public at large" or "forcing Enron to do so"; (2) eliminating Enron stock as a plan
investment option and as the form of the employer match under the Savings Plan; (3)
"alert[ing] the... regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and the Department of Labor, to the
misstatements." Id. at 566. But none of these courses would have averted, indeed they
would have precipitated, the harm that results from public disclosure of the misconduct,
which causes the stock price to plunge.
171. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.222 (1980).
172. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.646 (1983).
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bringing fraud to light, was not an improper disclosure where the party
making the disclosure, did not desire, nor receive, an improper personal
benefit. As such, tippees from the analyst who was tipped, could trade with
impunity. '73
Surely, the company would not want to make a public disclosure of
the fact of $25 billion in liabilities. 17 4 Yet, a Form 8-K might have been
required where this number would mean a material change in assets. Still,
until a Form 8-K is filed, this court believed that the company's ERISA
fiduciary, to the extent it knows of the underlying facts, may not give
advance notice to plan participants to enable them to beat the market. The
court stated, "[1]ike any other investor, plan participants have no lawful
right, before anyone else is informed of Enron's negative financial picture,
to profit from fraudulently inflated stock prices or to avoid financial loss by
selling early before public disclosure.,'
175
Is the employee-shareholder "any other investor"? Perhaps not, since
whether she funds her retirement plan with Enron stock or cash or another
company's stock was not up to the employee (as the plan required funding
"primarily" in company stock, and this is what Enron did). The employees
wholly lacked the discretion, the autonomy of a voluntary market
participant, but arguably had the most to lose by a decision made by the
very person engaging in conduct calculated to compromise the
investment.1
76
The court in In re Worldcom, Inc. ERISA Litigation177 followed the
reasoning of Enron and held that plan fiduciaries had a duty to make
disclosures to plan participants as well as to the public.
178
Plaintiffs complained that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to
act with prudence, among other things, when they "continued to offer
Worldcom stock as an investment alternative under the plan" and failed "to
investigate and monitor the plan's investments, including its investment in
Worldcom stock", then divest the plans of Worldcom stock based upon
information discovered. 1
79
Defendants sought to avoid liability on the theory that they had no
discretion as to whether an investment in Worldcom stock should be
173. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666-67.
174. See text accompanying note 4,supra.
175. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666-67.
176. See text accompanying notes 100 to 107 and 115 to 117, supra on fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty.
177. 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
178. Under the plans, participants had a choice of several different funds in which to
invest, including Worldcom stock.. Id. at 753, 754. Participants had discretion to make
allocations among the investment options with the right to "reduce or eliminate their
investments in Worldcom stock at any time." Id. 754.
179. Id. at 763-64.
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offered to employees because the plan description offered it and plan
participants exercised independent control over the assets in their
accounts. 80 The court ruled that ERISA does not shield fiduciaries from
liability in these circumstances if the investment decisions were "'not
independent,' if a plan fiduciary has concealed material non-public facts
regarding the investment from the participants unless the disclosure would
violate the law."'' The court further held:
[t]o the extent, therefore, that any plan fiduciary had
responsibility to decide or present it [sic] views on the wisdom of
the investment options, it would have been a breach of that duty
not to alert Worldcom of the need to eliminate, or at least, to
consider eliminating Worldcom stock as one of the investment
alternatives.' 82
That the plan here was an ESOP, in which employees had the
opportunity to invest solely in the employer's stock, did not relieve a
fiduciary from liability for continuing to offer such an investment where
subsequent events not anticipated by the settlor of the trust made continued
investment in the company's stock imprudent. 83 The offering of employer
stock as an investment option was a fiduciary, not a business, decision.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the chief executive officer breached his
fiduciary duty to monitor the plan's other fiduciary and his duty of loyalty
by the failure to disclose to the other fiduciaries material facts he knew or
should have known about the financial condition of the company.
84
Defendants responded that the duty to disclose arises under the federal
securities laws and not under ERISA. Allowing the plaintiffs to state an
ERISA claim for failure to disclose information, if material, would
"impermissibly extend[] the reach of ERISA and impose[] on corporations
a duty of continuous disclosure not contemplated by the well-developed
regime of securities regulation.' ' 85  Defendants argued further that
plaintiffs' allegations, if accepted, would "impose[] a continuous duty of
disclosure on ERISA fiduciaries that [would] overwhelm[] the federal
securities law disclosure requirements and compel fiduciaries to violate the
prohibitions against insider trading."'8 6 In other words, the defendants said,
the ERISA fiduciary/insider, upon discovery of material information
affecting the value of company stock as an investment option, is confronted
with two conflicting options: disclose the material information to plan
180. Id. at 764, 764, n.12 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2550:404c-(c)(2)).
181. Id. at 764.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571, 572 (3d Cir. 1995)).
184. Id. at 765.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 766.
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participants before a public disclosure, thereby violating prohibitions on the
insider trading by suggesting that they divest stock based upon this material
information, or make a public disclosure, thereby exposing the plan
participants to harm when the market reacted to the adverse information.'87
The court rejected defendants' argument, first finding that when the
chief executive officer wore his ERISA "hat" he was required to "act with
all the care, diligence, and prudence required of ERISA fiduciaries,"
meaning that he had a duty to disclose to all the investment fiduciaries
material information he had regarding the prudence of investing in
Worldcom stock.'88 "[H]e is not assumed to have forgotten adverse
information he may have acquired while acting in a corporate capacity.' 89
The court further rejected the suggested tension between the federal
securities laws and ERISA that would cause dismissal of the claim,
although the reasoning is not convincing. The court explained that ERISA
fiduciaries are forbidden to convey false information to plan participants
"when a prudent fiduciary would understand that the information was
false."' 90  And, nothing in the plaintiffs' claim "require[d] ERISA
fiduciaries to convey non-public material information to plan
participants."' 9' Instead, what was required was that "any information that
is conveyed to participants be conveyed in compliance with the standard of
care that applies to ERISA fiduciaries,"' 92 that is, that it be truthful and
complete. 19' However, plaintiffs alleged that defendants made
misrepresentations about the soundness of Worldcom stock and failed to
fully and accurately disclose to them, the stock's infirmities, causing them
to make and maintain their investments. 94 But the disclosure they maintain
should have been made, would entail all material, even non-public
information (that is, the truth), the absence of which would cause harm to
the plan beneficiary. The court did not directly respond to this point,
saying simply that "the existence of duties under one federal statute does
not, absent express congressional intent to the contrary, preclude the
imposition of overlapping duties under another federal statutory regime."' 95
But, is there express congressional intent to the contrary? Under ERISA,
Congress imposed high standards of care and loyalty upon the fiduciary (to
187. Id.
188. Id. at 765.
189. Id. at 766.
190. Id. at 767.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The defendants, having spoken in SEC filings, "had a duty under federal securities
laws to correct any prior material misrepresentation, when it became aware of the falsity."
Id. at 767.
194. Id. at 766.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
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act for the "exclusive purposes . . .", "solely in the interests of the plan
participants") and went on to provide that the express standards imposed
were to be expanded by common law principles, which have been
interpreted to impose the "highest duties" upon plan trustees. It seems that
requiring disclosure and meaningful advice to plan participants about the
wisdom of investing in company stock, is necessary for the achievement of
the congressional aim of protecting employee rights in pension plans.
Otherwise, plans funded primarily by company stock (the value of which
the company knows to be seriously compromised by illegal, fraudulent or
reckless conduct) would become complete frauds.
Other courts have followed in lockstep fashion the earlier rulings of
other courts, such as Enron and Worldcom, without much analysis of the
issues. For example, in Rankin v. Rots, 196 plaintiffs, plan participants,
alleged against several ERISA fiduciaries that they breached their fiduciary
duty by, among other things, continuing to invest in and promoting
company stock when they knew of a substantial risk of doing so and failing
to provide all material information about the company's serious financial
troubles, which severely threatened plan assets.' 97 The defendants moved
to dismiss arguing, among other things, that "to the extent they had any
fiduciary duties with respect to the disclosure of information, they could
not have, as a matter of law, breached them." Such disclosure of non-
public information about the company, they maintained, would have
violated securities laws against insider trading.'9" The court relied upon the
ruling in Worldcom,' 99 essentially quoting large sections from that decision,
without any explanation why it was the better view among the cases
addressing the issue.200 The court simply believed that the duties under
ERISA and the securities laws could exist and be fulfilled concomitantly.2'
In In re CMS Energy ERISA Litigation,°2 plaintiffs were plan
participants203 that sued their employers and certain directors and officers
of the companies, alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA in failing to manage the plan assets with loyalty and prudence, to
196. 278 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
197. Id. at 863, 864, 867.
198. Id. at 873.
199. 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
200. Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 875-76.
201. Id. at 874-75.
202. 312 F. Supp. 2d 898 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
203. The Plan allowed employees to direct contributions into an investment of their
choosing from several options, including Fund CS, which consisted primarily of CMS stock.
Id. at 902. Another part of the plan, provided for employer matching contributions up to 3%
of an employee's salary to be directed into the participating employee's ESOP account.
Incentive contributions were also sometimes contributed to employees' ESOP accounts. Id.
Both the matching employer contributions and incentive contributions were made primarily
in company stock. Id..
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provide full and truthful information to plan participants, failing to oversee
the activities of the plan's investing fiduciaries, and causing the plan to
engage in a prohibited transaction, that is, by acquiring CMS stock for the
plan at a price greater than adequate consideration.2°
Plaintiffs alleged that CMS engaged in "round-trip" electricity trades,
whereby purchases and sales of electricity occurred simultaneously, with
the same parties and at the same price. These trades gave the appearance of
an increased volume of buying and selling and increased revenues and
expenses by $4.4 billion, but in truth they had no economic substance.
They were contrary to generally accepted accounting practices and
"rendered the financial statements materially false., 205 When these trades
came to light and an investigation commenced, the price of CMS stock
dropped significantly. °6 Plaintiffs maintained that the truth about these
trades should have been disclosed to plan participants.
Defendants argued that they invested employee contributions "exactly
as required by the explicit terms" of the plan and were not free to reject a
choice made by the plan participants.2 7 The court accepted plaintiffs'
argument in reply that to the extent that the plan provided for funding
primarily, although not exclusively, in company stock, the defendants had a
fiduciary duty to consider the wisdom of that decision; that they had a duty
under ERISA not to follow the plan if to do so would mean acting
imprudently.2 8 Therefore, defendants could be liable for continuing to
fund the plan with company stock, although the court held differently on
the allegation that they should have disclosed information for purposes of
divestment.
Defendants argued that they were precluded from obtaining inside
information about CMS' questionable trading and lawfully using such
information to benefit plan participants because that would have amounted
to "tipping" as proscribed by securities laws.209
The court relied on Rankin v. Rots, 2'0 an opinion by a court in its
jurisdiction, which quoted extensively from Worldcom, accepting
defendants' argument.2 1
204. Id. at 903.
205. Id. at 902-03 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Id. at 903.
207. Id. at 913.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 914. The defendants relied on Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corp., No.
3:00-778-17, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343, at *26 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001), which held that a
fiduciary does not breach an ERISA fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to plan participants
material non-public information, which would violate the insider trading laws.
210. 278 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
211. CMS Energy, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 915 ("existence of duties under one federal statute
does not, absent express congressional intent to the contrary, preclude the imposition of
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In Hill v. BellSouth,2 the court endeavored to narrow the disclosure
duty to cases presenting special circumstances. The court, however, was
not successful, since the circumstances presented there occur in virtually
every case. The court otherwise did not resolve the insider trading
dilemma. There, plaintiffs, plan participants and beneficiaries sued
defendants, the company sponsoring the plan and various officers and
directors alleging breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.2 13 A year earlier,
the company erroneously accounted for certain consumer accounts as
realized revenue. These inaccurate revenue statements were reported both
to the SEC and to the public through a series of SEC filings and press
releases. Later, the company issued a press release revealing the
overstatement to be $163 million, or about $.09 per share. The release was
followed by an SEC filing.214
Plaintiffs alleged that they invested in company stock based upon
communications from defendants in which they discussed the advantages
of company stock as a plan option, but omitted to provide information that
was later reported in SEC filings which revealed the risks in continuing this
investment.21 5 Plaintiffs maintained the information should have been
provided to them before the public SEC filing.
Defendants moved to dismiss arguing that they had no affirmative
duty to disclose information not specified by ERISA; indeed to do so,
revealing "'inside information' to Plaintiffs might be a violation of [the]
Rule 1 Ob-5" prohibitions against insider trading.216 Defendants argued also
that there was no proximate cause between their alleged failure to disclose
because even if that information should have been disclosed, upon its
public release the market would have immediately adjusted the stock price
downward, and Plaintiffs could only have sold at the lower price.217
However, discreet disclosures only to plan participants would be different.
According to scholars on the issue,218 trading based on non-public
information communicates to the market which leads to a price adjustment,
but the initial trading by plan participants (until the market reacted) would
overlapping duties under another federal statutory regime.") (internal indentation omitted)
(quoting Worldcom, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 766-67).
212. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
213. Id. at 1364. Under the plan, participants contributed a portion of their salaries to the
plan and had the right to determine in which of the plan's investment options those
contributions would be invested, one of which was the BellSouth Stock Fund, invested in
shares of company's stock. Id. Matching employer contributions were made in company
stock. Id. Initially, employees were prohibited from transferring matching contributions to
other plan funds, but the plan was later modified to permit this. Id.
214. Id. at 1365.
215. Id. at 1365.
216. Id. at 1366.
217. Id.
218. See text accompanying notes 56 to 65, supra.
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have enabled the plan participants to minimize their losses in the meantime.
Though a mass dumping of company stock would seem to more quickly
inform the market about the value of the stock sold.
Nonetheless, the court accepted the defendant's argument that the duty
to disclose was limited, but it did not address the insider trading issue.
Pointing to In re Enron,219 the court found a willingness among courts "to
find an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose information beyond the
traditional duties to disclose specified in the statute or the common law
obligation to respond to specific requests from plan participants or
beneficiaries., 220 However, the court cautioned, "this new affirmative duty
to disclose has only been imposed in 'special circumstances with a
potentially "extreme impact" on a plan as a whole, where plan participants
generally could be materially and negatively affected.' 221' Thus, this court
did not recognize a general duty to disclose the financial details of the
business.222 Nonetheless, the court accepted the plaintiffs allegations as
true and the defendant admitted that certain investments were risky, that the
company was losing money in an area in which the company was alone
among its peers, and that revenues had been inflated by accounting
misdeeds. 223 These facts would have signaled to the prudent fiduciary that
continued investment in company stock was not wise.224 In addition,
during this period, the defendants kept encouraging employee investment
in the company stock, which by then already represented 40% of the plan's
assets.225
The court otherwise did not reach the insider trading assertions made
by defendants; that divesting their funds of company stock based upon the
disclosed information would have been illegal.
In In re Westar Energy, Inc., ERISA Litigation,226 plan participants
sued the corporate sponsor along with individual fiduciaries 227 alleging,
inter alia violations of the duty of prudence and loyalty228 when the
219. 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 555 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
220. Hill v. BellSouth, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citing In re Enron,
284 F. Supp. 2d at 559).
221. Id. at 1370 (citing In re Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 559).
222. Id. at 1369.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1368, 1369.
225. Id.
226. No. 03-4032-JAR, 2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 28585, *2 (D.Kan. Sept. 29, 2005).
227. The defendants included the corporation sponsor, the Investment and Benefits
Committee, the administrator of the Plan, David D. Wittig, the former chief executive
officer, and nine individual members of the Committee. Id. at *4.
228. Id. at *5. The pension plan matched employee contributions up to a maximum of
50% of the first 6% of the participant's contributions, which were made in either common
stock or cash. Id. at *7, *8, n.9. For most of the life of the plan, the company matched
contributions with company stock. In fact, until just before the suit was instituted, company
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defendants misrepresented or failed to disclose the facts regarding certain
risky and burdensome enterprises and restructuring, company
compensation policy, and accounting irregularities.229  Specifically
plaintiffs complained that the company embarked on acquisitions of
unregulated businesses, acquiring three companies at a price exceeding
$650 million, which resulted in a substantial decline in the company's net
income (by some $140 million) and a substantial increase in debt
obligations (by some 416%).230 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the
actions the company undertook resulted in a restructuring scheme which
saddled the company with a capital structure of 93% debt, all the while the
company made public statements that the restructuring would be beneficial
for the company, knowing that events and occurrences showed
otherwise.23' In addition, the company permitted a variety of executive
compensation schemes and self-dealing transactions calculated to drain
232corporate resources. It seems that the kinds of information plaintiffs
maintained should have been disclosed to them was the kind that should be
included in one or all of the company's periodic reports required by the
federal securities disclosure laws. 233 But these would only be filed at the
end of the year or quarter, or sooner, by a form 8-K, though the precise
timing would be somewhat within the corporation's discretion (particularly
in determining when a reportable event had occurred). Plan participants,
though, maintained that the information should have been discreetly
disclosed to them first to avoid those losses that resulted once the public
became aware of these reckless actions.
Defendants asserted, among other things, that to make the disclosures
plaintiffs identified, would have required them to violate securities laws on
insider trading and that ERISA cannot be construed to "invalidate, impair,
[or] supersede any law of the United States., 234 The court interpreted the
defendant's argument as one involving "the theory of 'inevitable loss,' that
any actions they might have taken would not have prevented the loss of
stock value."235  At the same time, it rejected that theory.236  The court
matching contributions were effectively locked into Westar stock, since matching
contributions were not permitted to be transferred into other investment accounts. Id. at *8.
This restriction did not apply to participants age 55 and older. Id. at *8, n.13. The
Investments and Benefits Committee had the power to adjust the "number and type of
Investment Funds... from time to time." Id.
229. Id. at *28-31,*43.
230. Id. at *28.
231. Id. at *29-30. These events and occurrences included the criticism by the Kansas
Corporation Commission and other experts, the rejection of a rate increase, and an actual
decrease in rates. Id. at *29.
232. Id. at *30.
233. See note 21, supra on periodic reporting required of regulated companies.
234. Id. at *50.
235. Id. at *50.
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simply chose to follow Enron, holding that plan fiduciaries must follow
both laws: there must be disclosure before trading, "whether impractical or
not, because continuing silence and deceit would only encourage the
alleged fraud and increase the extent of injury.
237
In the case of In re Electronic Data Systems Corp. "ERISA"
238Litigation, plan participants brought suit alleging breach of fiduciary
duty by failure to disclose the great risks associated with some of the
company's "mega-deals", i.e., "multi-year information technology
outsourcing contracts negotiated for over $250 million each., 239  These
risky ventures had an adverse effect on plaintiffs' retirement plan,24°
including a loss in value of EDS stock upon announcement by the company
that it would fall short of its expected earnings per share by some seventy
percent.24' Upon the announcement, the EDS "stock price plummeted over
[50%], wiping out some $8 billion in market value, including significant
[p]lan value for shares held by [p]lan participants and beneficiaries in the
EDS stock fund. 242
Plaintiffs alleged that
[d]efendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by
continuing to invest [p]lan funds in EDS stock despite knowledge
that the stock was an inherently risky investment[;] by failing to
[p]rudently manage plan investments[;] by continuing to invest
[p]lan assets in high-risk EDS stock[; by] misle[ading]
[p]laintiffs .. .by issuing false and misleading Summary Plan
Descriptions . . . to [p]lan beneficiaries[; and by] fail[ing] to
disclose inherent risks in EDS' IT outsourcing contracts and in its
association with the airline industry.243
As to plaintiffs' argument that defendants failed to provide full and
truthful information and that they otherwise misled plaintiffs as to EDS's
financial condition, defendants argued that even if they had a duty to
236. Id. at *53-54. The court also questioned the propriety of the "inevitable loss"
defense to causation where defendants knew of the misrepresentations for some period of
time , but took no action which only prolonged and exacerbated the loss. Id. at 54-55.
237. Id. at *53-54.
238. 305 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
239. Id. at 661. While the company boasted of the value of these "mega-deals" on the
company's revenues, it did not disclose that the deals carried great risks. Id. at 662.
240. Under the plan, employees contributed up to 20% of their income into one or more
various investment options, among which was the EDS Stock Fund, comprised almost
entirely (99%) of EDS stock. The employer's matching contributions were in the form of
EDS stock. Id. Two years before the company announced it would not make its financial
projections, the EDS Stock Fund represented nearly 21 percent of total plan assets. Id. at
662.
241. Id. at 662.
242. Id. at 662-63.
243. Id. at 663 (footnote omitted).
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provide information to plan participants (which they did not concede), to
fulfill that duty would have required that they violate insider trading laws,
since the information plaintiffs sought was corporate information and not
publicly available. 244  The court agreed with defendants that fulfilling
fiduciary duties does not require a violation of law. Nothing in ERISA
"impos[es] a so-called 'duty to tip.' '2 45  However, the court ruled that
[d]efendants would not be allowed to use the securities laws as a shield
against liability under ERISA.246 The court found the treatment of the same
issue by the court in Enron to be persuasive-that ERISA and the
Securities Act could be read and applied in harmony, requiring disclosure
of material information to plan participants, but also disclosure to the
investing public, since silence only compounds the injury. 47
But injury to whom? Silence as to the plan participants causes injury
as they continue to invest their funds in stock with questionable value.
Disclosure, enabling divestment, avoids that injury. Silence as to open
market traders causes injury when the trader buys that stock at a higher
price than if the market had been informed of the negative, price adjusting
information. But a public announcement will enable open market traders to
avoid losses altogether, by deciding not to purchase in the first place,
leaving employees holding the worthless stock. Therefore, the only losers
would be the employees.
C. Skirting the Issue
Some courts, rather than dealing with the issue head on or taking a
position that would be clearly disingenuous, have skirted the issue
altogether. In In re Williams Companies ERISA Litigation,248 plaintiffs,
pension fund participants, alleged that the plan fiduciaries breached their
duties by failing to disclose that the company "was operating below
company sponsored expectations"; that is, "it was impossible for [the
company] to meet its financial goals . . .without substantially revising
estimates to include massive cap-ex spending reductions," 249 information
which suggested that investment in the company stock was imprudent.50
244. Id. at 673.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 673.
247. Id. at 673 (citing In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & "ERISA" Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d
511, 565 (S.D. Tex. 2003)).
248. 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
249. Id. at 1336.
250. The plan permitted, but did not require, employees to invest a portion of their salary
in a range of options, including company stock. Id. at 1331. Indeed it allowed up to 100%
of assets to be invested in company stock. Id. at 1332. The plan "promoted employee
ownership" through the company's voluntary matching contribution, which was "invested
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The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds (among others) that:
(1) they had no duty to disclose material non-public financial
information and, in any event, any such disclosure would have
constituted a violation of federal securities laws; (2) they had no
duty to eliminate [company stock] as an investment option and,
even if they did, Section 404(c) of ERISA insulates them from
liability, that section exempting the plan from the diversification
requirement; and (3) they had no duty to avoid any alleged
conflict of interest.
251
The court rejected all three arguments, although it did not give
separate reasons for each defense, finding that "parsing of the alleged
actions by the Committee defendants [would not be] useful at this stage of
the litigation. 252  The court specifically found that the plan gave the
Investment Committee the discretion to recommend investment options to
the Benefits Committee and the Benefits Committee in turn was given the
discretion to delete or establish an Investment Fund.253 Since the plan did
not require that company stock be offered as an investment option, "any
plan fiduciary had a duty to decide or present its views on the wisdom of
investment options. , 25 4 Therefore, it would have been a breach of that duty
not to remove, or at a minimum consider the removal of company stock as
an investment option, given the devastating facts about the company's
financial condition.255 In the court's view, "the duty to disclose, the duty to
eliminate inappropriate investment options and the duty to avoid a conflict
of interest were in effect different aspects of a single fiduciary duty.
2 56
Indeed, the court found that "had the Investment Committee recommended
removing company stock from the list of available investment options,
based upon its alleged knowledge that company stock was wrongfully
inflated, the alleged damage would not have occurred., 257  The court
otherwise did not address the insider trading prohibition asserted by the
defendants, leaving it unclear whether the fiduciary, after having
considered the prudence of company stock as an investment, would have
had to disclose publicly the basis of this conclusion so that plan participants
solely" in the company's common stock, id. at 1333, and allwed participants to diversify
out of the company match and certain accounts "when their employment was terminated or
upon reaching a designated age--initially 55, later lowered to 50." Id. at 1334. As it stood,
the plan participants had no choice but to fund their pension plans largely with company
stock.
251. Id. at 1340.
252. Id. at 1343.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citing In re Worldcom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1342.
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could divest.
In Xcel Energy, Inc., Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation,258
plaintiffs were plan participants2 9 who alleged that defendants failed to
advise plan participants of substantial risks to Xcel stock associated with
certain contracts, "round-trip trading" and certain cross-default contract
provisions,260 or otherwise take action such as diversification to protect plan
assets.26' They argued that as plan fiduciaries, defendants had an obligation
to invest plan funds with prudence and for the sole benefit of plan
participants. They maintained that defendants also had a duty to "monitor
individuals assigned fiduciary duties, investigate matters posing significant
risk to the plans, and disclose material adverse information to plan
participants. 2 62  When the cross-default provisions became public, the
stock price of Xcel dropped precipitously (by almost 36%).263 While the
court agreed with defendants that parts of the plan-that ESOP funds be
invested in company stock and that the company stock be included as an
investment option-were plan design decisions, not subject to ERISA's
fiduciary standards, the defendants had misread plaintiffs' allegations.
264
The court pointed out that plaintiffs complained about the failure to
disclose "material adverse information about the true value of the stock. 265
This was a breach of fiduciary duty.
Defendants argued further that they could not have disclosed the
adverse information to plaintiffs and not to the investing public so that plan
participants could trade their stock in light of the prohibitions against
insider trading.266 On this argument, the court followed the Enron line of
cases refusing to allow ERISA plan fiduciaries to put up the securities laws
as a bar to liability for breaching ERISA fiduciary duties.267 Thus, while
the court held that defendants had a duty to make disclosures of these
adverse conditions to plan participants, it did not expressly state that the
258. 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Minn. 2004).
259. Id. at 1174. Under the ESOP, investments were primarily in company stock.
Participants contributed a portion of their pay to various investment funds, including an
Xcel stock fund. The company made matching contributions to the ESOPs either in Xcel
stock or cash which was to be invested in Xcel stock. In the non-ESOP component,
contributions were either in cash or company stock to the particular investment selected by
the employee. Id. at 1173.
260. Id. at 1174.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1181.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1181-82 (citing Electronic Data Systems Corp. "ERISA " Litigation, 305 F.
Supp. 2d 658, 672 (E.D. Tex. 2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & "ERISA" Litig., 284
F. Supp. 2d 511, 565 (S.D. Tex. 2003)).
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plan participants could not use this information for purposes of divesting,
although by adopting the reasoning of Enron, that would be the logical
conclusion.
VI. RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
The conflict is this. Some courts rule that a plan fiduciary has no duty
to disclose to plan participants facts of financial misconduct or other
adverse circumstances which might influence the decision of the plan
participant to dispose of company stock if such disclosure is not a public
one and the information would be used for trading. Other courts impose
liability upon plan fiduciaries for failing to make the same disclosure to
plan participants, but also impose a duty upon the fiduciary not to violate
insider trading laws, by enabling trading, thereby requiring a public
disclosure before any trading occurs.
How can these cases be harmonized? How can the affirmative duties
imposed by ERISA on a plan fiduciary be reconciled with the prohibition
on insider trading under the securities laws? Should the plan fiduciary who
is a corporate insider be required or permitted to make discreet disclosures
to plan participants of information having a negative impact on the value of
company stock as an investment, allowing divestment of that stock? Here
are some relevant considerations.
The prohibition on insider trading is not absolute. Instead, it binds
only those who have a duty, either to those with whom the possessor of the
information is trading, to the corporation whose shares are being traded, or
to the source of the information. Thus, one who obtains information
through independent research, fortuitously, and even by theft, is free to
trade to the disadvantage of the other party. With this is the reflection of
the idea that the securities laws cannot and should not strive to equalize all
risks in the market; there are some informational disadvantages that are
unavoidable. And, the Supreme Court has held that liability for trading on
non-public information does not arise "merely from one's ability to acquire
information because of his position in the market.
2 68
How is the plight of the employee-shareholder similar to the fortuitous
possessor of information? It seems that they are not. Instead, they seem in
no different position than the insider in O'Hagan, who obtained
information by virtue of his fiduciary relationship to the source of the
information and traded on that information in breach of a duty owed to that
source. 26 9 However, where the plan fiduciary discloses information to the
plan participant, surely it is done in fulfillment of a duty imposed by law
268. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33, n. 14 (1980).
269. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1997).
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for the purpose of allowing the plan participant to rethink -an existing
investment course of action. Thus, the plan participant, if he trades, would
not be acting in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.
But if the information is confidential and the source had a duty not to
disclose it, then the plan participant might be liable derivatively for trading
if the source of the information received some improper personal benefit in
exchange.270 Under the Dirks analysis, it is arguable that a disclosure to the
plan participants would not be actionable where the ERISA fiduciary does
not personally benefit by the disclosure, but is only acting to protect plan
beneficiaries.271 Yet, the broad definition given to personal benefit by the
Supreme Court, including a reputational advantage which might translate
into a pecuniary benefit in the future, would suffice. Does the ERISA
fiduciary obtain such an advantage from protecting the assets of the plan?
The court did not find such a benefit in Dirks, where the insider tipped an
analyst, who alerted clients, to the "massive fraud 27 2 taking place in the
corporation whose shares were traded.273
Even if the corporation discloses the information to the plan fiduciary
without restrictions on what could be done with it and plan participants
trade, is there such unfairness to other market traders as would greatly
affect the integrity of the market? 274 Would Regulation FD require the
corporation to make a public disclosure?275 The case that this sort of
trading by plan participants is not unfair to parties on the other side of the
trades is hard to make. Yet, Chiarella held that not all instances of
unfairness amount to fraud.
76
The rulings from the courts supposedly requiring disclosure to both
plan participants and to the public are not satisfying; they leave millions of
innocent employee-investors subject to harm and may impose onerous
270. Id. at 652, 665 n. 11 (describing what the misappropriation theory covers and
"uphold[ing] the misappropriation theory on the basis of [section] 10(b) [of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934]").
271. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. at 664 (holding that, regardless of "whether an insider
personally benefits from a particular disclosure . . . there must be a breach of the insider's
fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain.")
272. Id. at 651-52 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
273. Cf id. at 651-52, 665, 667 (holding that Dirks had "no pre-existing fiduciary duty to
[the corporation's] shareholders," and that he "had no duty to abstain from use of the inside
information that he obtained.")
274. Since the insiders would not themselves be trading (the original "unfairness"
rationale) some other justification is in order. The original concern seemed to focus more
upon the undue enrichment by the insiders as opposed to the losses to the party on the other
side, since unless the insiders were trading, no disclosure needed to be made and
information obtained other than through a corporate position could be used to trade without
liability. See discussion of Chiarella and soundness of the prohibitions on insider trading, at
text accompanying notes 54 to 73, supra.
275. See note 53, supra, for discussion of Regulation FD.
276. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
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disclosure duties on corporations that far exceed the requirements of the
Securities Acts and ERISA. ERISA and the Securities Acts serve discrete
aims: ERISA to encourage and safeguard employee retirement plans
through stringent fiduciary duties requiring prudent and loyal management,
and the Securities Acts to encourage periodic disclosure to ensure informed
investment decisions.
It is a better starting point to consider the extent to which the plan
participants had actual control over the investment of plan assets. If they
do not, then requiring a plan fiduciary to disclose material non-public
information will help avoid injury to one who is as innocent as the person
on the other side of the trade. In virtually all of the cases discussed here,
the employees were either encouraged to invest in company stock or the
employer's matching contributions were almost entirely in company stock,
with little discretion or judgment being exercised by the fiduciaries as to
whether this was a prudent course, despite information suggesting
otherwise. It is important to consider whether persons on the other side of
the trade assume a degree of risk in investing in the stocks to start with, and
whether research could have produced the non-public information, or at
least some warning signs. The securities laws should not aid those who
knowingly engage in a crooked game and fail to exercise a certain
vigilance. At the same time, employees have limited say as to whether
their retirement benefits take the form of cash or company stock. It is also
important to consider what is at stake in these investments. Does the
interest in protecting pension plan benefits outweigh the possible harm to
shareholders dealing without equal information in an anonymous market?
So solve this problem, Congress could require that no plan fiduciary
be an insider of the corporation. However, this would only result in less
information than is currently available. The possible losses to pensioners
might also be reduced by stricter limits on the extent that pension plans can
be funded with company stock and rules enabling the sale of company
stock at will.
The best approach would allow for the fiduciary and insider
obligations to coexist. While not permitting the corporate insider to make
non-public disclosures to facilitate trades by the employee-shareholders,
courts could read the ERISA fiduciary duty to require him or her to advise
the employees that further investment in the company would not be wise,
but without stating why, if that would reveal non-public corporate
information, and to urge the company to match contributions in other than
company stock. This decision not to fund pension plans with company
stock would not be a trade and therefore not prohibited by insider trading
laws. But would this nonetheless send signals to the market, if it were
announced that the company would no longer offer its stock as an
investment option to employees? Would the ERISA fiduciary have to
2007] To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE? 877
make a public announcement of a change in investment policy? Could the
employees then trade their existing holdings? Even if sophisticated
investors would surmise that something unsavory is occurring and bid
lower, or start selling off shares, causing some decline in the market price
of the company stock, this approach on handling the dual duties owed by
insiders and ERISA fiduciaries would go a long way toward reducing
potentially devastating losses to pensioners.
